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Title II of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 establishes a new specialized insolvency regime, known as orderly liquidation,
for systemically significant nonbank financial companies. While well intended, Title
II unfortunately raises a number of serious constitutional questions. To vest
authority in an Article III judge to appoint a receiver for such companies, yet also
avoid a financial panic, Dodd–Frank requires that the judicial proceedings be
conducted in secret, with no notice to the public or other interested parties on pain
of criminal penalties, and that the judge rule on the petition to appoint the receiver
within twenty-four hours of its filing. These unprecedented procedures raise serious
questions under the Due Process Clause, Article III of the Constitution, and the
First Amendment. The very broad discretion given to the executive branch to
decide whether a distressed financial firm should be subject to mandatory liquidation
under Title II, as opposed to conventional bankruptcy, also raises questions under the
uniformity requirement of the Constitution’s Bankruptcy Clause. Finally, Title II
raises a number of potential issues under the Takings Clause. Given the extremely
abbreviated time for judicial appointment of a receiver, the prohibition on any stay
pending appeal, and the absence of any post-appointment judicial review of the
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decision to place a firm into receivership, there are a number of vexing questions
about how and when the constitutional issues raised by Title II might be presented
to the courts. This Article examines these constitutional and procedural questions
and argues that Congress should amend the Dodd–Frank Act to provide for plenary
judicial review after rather than before a receiver is appointed. This simple change,
along with amendments tightening some of the language that indicates when orderly
liquidation rather than bankruptcy is appropriate, would help ensure that the new
Title II authority is not undermined by a welter of constitutional claims—if and
when it becomes necessary to use this authority to avert a future financial crisis.
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Dodd–Frank: Too Big for the Constitution?
INTRODUCTION

The Dodd–Frank Act 1 is the federal government’s most significant
response to the financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the severe recession that
followed. If the precipitating event of the Great Depression was the 1929
stock market crash, the September 15, 2008 filing of Lehman Brothers’s
bankruptcy petition was the analogous triggering event for the Great
Recession. 2 Within hours of the filing, credit markets froze up, and the Dow
Jones Industrial Average plunged 504 points. 3 One day later, the federal
government advanced funds, eventually totaling $182 billion, to prevent the
collapse of insurance giant AIG. 4 Within weeks, a reluctant Congress
created a $700 billion fund, known as the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP), to provide emergency funds to financial firms regarded as “too big
to fail.” 5
Observers drew two main lessons from these traumatic events. The first
was that conventional bankruptcy tools were inadequate when dealing with
insolvency of a major investment bank like Lehman Brothers. 6 A significant
portion of Lehman’s business consisted of making long-term loans funded
by short-term borrowing. 7 Unlike a traditional bank, which makes long-term
loans funded by government-insured deposits, Lehman obtained funds to
support its lending activity through short-term borrowing from other
financial firms secured by collateral such as mortgage-backed securities. 8
When the housing bubble started to burst in 2007–2008, the value of this
collateral became uncertain. Lehman’s counterparties demanded more and
better collateral, and when rumors began circulating that Lehman might be
insolvent, they refused to deal with Lehman at all, causing a general panic
2F

3F

4F

5F

6F

7F

8F

9F

1 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
2 Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, vol. 1 at 13, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No.
08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Examiner’s Report].
3 Id. (citation omitted).
4 Id. (citation omitted).
5 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 created TARP. See Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified in scattered sections of 12
and 26 U.S.C.) (providing the requisite authority for the federal government to purchase
distressed assets from financial institutions in an attempt to stabilize the U.S. economy and
significant financial institutions).
6 John L. Douglas & Randall D. Guynn, Resolution of US Banks and Other Financial Institutions,
in DEBT RESTRUCTURING 311, 359 (Look Chan Ho & Nick Segal eds., 2011).
7 Examiner’s Report, supra note 2, vol. 1 at 3.
8 For background regarding the rise of the rehypothecation (repo) market and its role in the
financial crisis, see generally GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC
OF 2007, at 13-59 (2010).
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among financiers analogous to a run on a bank by depositors. 9 For a variety
of reasons, including the fact that collateralized debt obligations are exempt
from the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay, 10 the bankruptcy court was
utterly helpless to stop the Lehman crisis from unfolding.
The second lesson that quickly became evident was that the only alternative
to bankruptcy under existing law was government bailouts of financial firms
deemed too big to fail.11 Nearly all observers recognized the problem
inherent in a policy of bailing out large financial firms when they become
overextended. If the government issues a standing promise to bail out the
biggest financial firms, it encourages such firms to engage in excessively
risky behavior, increasing the likelihood of the very type of financial crisis
everyone would like to avoid. 12 Moreover, a government bailout guarantee,
10F

1F

13F

9 Former Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner’s explanation of Lehman’s collapse was
that investors and counterparties lost confidence in its ability to meet its obligations, reminiscent
of an old-fashioned run on the bank. TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON
FINANCIAL CRISES 152, 164-68, 172-74, 176-83, 189 (2014). For a similar explanation from an
academic economist, see generally GORTON, supra note 8.
10 The Bankruptcy Code was amended in 2005 to exempt so-called “qualified financial
contracts” (QFCs) from resolution in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 903–904, 119 Stat. 23, 160-66 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 9 (2006) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8) (2012))
(establishing that the appointment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as a
conservator or receiver will not affect a party’s right to terminate, liquidate, accelerate, set-off,
transfer, or modify previously entered QFCs).
Some academic commentators have suggested that a better response to the Lehman Brothers’s
experience and the financial crisis would be to eliminate this carveout in the Bankruptcy Code. See
David A. Skeel, Jr., & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in
Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 200-01 (2012); see also BANKRUPTCY NOT BAILOUT: A
SPECIAL CHAPTER 14 (Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor eds., 2012) (urging the adoption of a
new chapter of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with systemically significant financial firms). This
complex topic, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
11 The Senate Report that laid the foundation for the Dodd–Frank Act noted that

[w]hen Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, the markets panicked and the crisis
escalated. With no other means to resolve large, complex and interconnected financial
firms, the government was left with few options other than to provide massive
assistance to prop up failing companies in an effort to prevent the crisis from spiraling
into a great depression.
Despite initial efforts of the government, credit markets froze and the U.S[.]
problem spread across the globe. The crisis on Wall Street soon spilled over onto
Main Street, touching the lives of most Americans and devastating many.
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 43-44 (2010).
12 Reducing this moral hazard was explicitly recognized as a basic purpose of the Dodd–
Frank Act. See Dodd–Frank Act § 204(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5384(a) (2012) (stating that the Act’s
purpose is “to provide the necessary authority to liquidate failing financial companies that pose a
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even if only implicit, allows the largest financial firms to obtain credit on
more favorable terms than ordinary financial firms, distorting incentives and
altering the competitive landscape in undesirable ways. 13
The American public, while perhaps not appreciating the nuances of the
policy arguments, unquestionably regarded the bailouts as grossly unfair.
Once the immediate crisis subsided, the bailed-out firms and their well-paid
officers and directors appeared to have survived quite nicely, while ordinary
folks still suffered the lingering effects of the downturn.
The idea that the federal government rescued large financial firms with
taxpayer dollars while ordinary citizens lost their jobs and watched their
savings evaporate resulted in widespread anger. Politicians seemed to agree,
at least publicly, that the general public should never again be taxed to prop
up giant financial firms that the government deems too big to fail. 14
In light of these perceived lessons from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
and the regime of bailouts that followed, the Obama administration quickly
concluded that a new insolvency regime was needed—one that would
unwind “systemically significant” financial firms like Lehman Brothers
while avoiding the undesirable incentives and public hostility to government bailouts. The administration therefore proposed a new type of
resolution authority, modeled after the process for shutting down insolvent
banks and savings and loan associations, as part of the package of proposed
financial reforms that eventually became the Dodd–Frank Act. 15 Ordinary
banks and savings and loan associations that accept government-insured
14F

15F

16F

significant risk to the financial stability of the United States in a manner that mitigates such risk
and minimizes moral hazard”).
13 Recent studies have suggested that this advantage is significant. See Kenichi Ueda & B.
Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions,
37 J. BANKING & FIN. 3830, 3840 (2013) (using the expectation of government bailouts embedded
in inflated credit ratings to estimate that the value of the structural subsidy given to systemically
important financial institutions is as much as eighty basis points); see also Why Should Taxpayers
Give Big Banks $83 Billion a Year?, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Feb. 20, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://
www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-02-20/why-should-taxpayers-give-big-banks-83-billion-ayear-, archived at http://perma.cc/SYM6-FM8Q (“Small as it might sound, 0.8 percentage point
makes a big difference. Multiplied by the total liabilities of the 10 largest U.S. banks by assets, it
amounts to a taxpayer subsidy of $83 billion a year[,] . . . tantamount to the government giving the
banks about 3 cents of every tax dollar collected.”).
14 For example, in 2013, the Senate unanimously approved an amendment to a proposed
budget for the 2014 fiscal year (which was not itself enacted) that called for eliminating all
subsidies or other funding advantages for any financial firm having more than $500 billion in
assets. 159 CONG. REC. S2284, S2289 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2013).
15 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, RESOLUTION AUTHORITY FOR LARGE,
INTERCONNECTED FINANCIAL COMPANIES ACT OF 2009, tit. XII ( July 23, 2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/title%20xii%20resolution%20
authority%207232009finala.pdf [hereinafter Administration’s Combined Draft].
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deposits have long been subject to special resolution procedures that use a
receivership or conservatorship; this authority was augmented before the
enactment of Dodd–Frank to include provisions allowing the receiver or
conservator to take systemic financial risk into account in certain circumstances.16
The Administration’s Combined Draft would create a similar type of
authority that applied to systemically significant financial firms, other than
banks and savings and loan associations, such as bank holding companies
and their subsidiaries. 17 Under this new resolution authority, government
agencies would be given broad discretion to decide on a case-by-case basis
when a bank holding company was in trouble and if its failure would pose a
threat to the economy. 18 This decision would lead to a takeover by a
government receiver or conservator, typically the FDIC, which would
proceed to run the company as it resolved claims of creditors until the firm
was liquidated or reorganized. 19 Positive-value assets could be transferred to
a “bridge financial company” and eventually folded into another firm. 20 If,
while the firm was being wound down, financing was required to meet its
obligations, the administration proposed that the necessary funds would be
supplied by the Treasury. 21
Like other provisions of the financial reform, the proposed resolution
authority was politically controversial. Opponents argued that the proposal
would institutionalize the hated regime of bailouts. 22 Proponents insisted
that the new resolution authority would put an end to bailouts. 23 The
legislative back-and-forth produced amendments that added further constraints
on the discretion of the executive branch in using the new authority. 24 One
17F

18F

19F

20F

21F

2F

23F

24F

25F

16 The FDIC is charged with administering the resolution of failed or capital-deficient
government-insured depositary institutions. The payment of deposits and other creditor claims by
the FDIC is generally governed by the “least-cost resolution” rule. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)
(2012). Under certain circumstances, however, the FDIC is allowed to diverge from the priority
scheme established by the least-cost resolution rule. Specifically, if adherence to the rule would
have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability, the FDIC is allowed to
take alternative actions to mitigate these adverse effects, including making selective payments to
non-depository creditors. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(G).
17 Administration’s Combined Draft, supra note 15, § 1204.
18 Id. § 1203.
19 Id. § 1209.
20 Id. § 1209(a)(1)(G)(i).
21 Id. § 1209(n).
22 See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD–FRANK
ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 117-18 (2011) (“The Obama administration made
the same argument: Their framework for administrative resolution of large financial institutions
didn’t ‘institutionalize bailouts,’ as critics complained; it would provide the benefits of bankruptcy
without the uncertainty.”).
23 Id.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 112-39.
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of these new constraints added by the Senate at the last minute—the
requirement that a federal district judge make the final decision to appoint a
receiver for a firm undergoing resolution—introduced the constitutional
questions that are a substantial focus of this Article. 25 Other changes
enhanced the punitive effects of the new resolution authority, raising further
constitutional questions.
In keeping with Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous adage that “[s]carcely
any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner
or later, into a judicial question,” 26 Dodd–Frank’s orderly liquidation
authority is now the subject of a lawsuit. Eleven state attorneys general have
sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
charging that the Act’s Title II violates the Due Process Clause, Article III
of the Constitution, and the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy
Clause. 27 The suit was dismissed by the district court for lack of standing
and ripeness 28 and is now on appeal before the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 29 Whether or not the D.C.
Circuit allows the case to proceed in its present posture, the plaintiffs’
arguments on the merits are surprisingly strong. Indeed, if the dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds is upheld, the constitutional arguments are likely to
reemerge at the worst possible time—if and when another financial crisis
hits and one or more systemically significant financial firms are slated for
orderly liquidation. Sorting out these constitutional questions in the midst
of a financial crisis could disrupt, or at least delay, the resolution process
envisioned by Congress. It would be far better to fix these problems now by
appropriate legislative amendment while the legal machinery associated
with Title II is being established.
Most of Title II’s constitutional infirmities stem from the decision to
have a federal district judge appoint the receiver for a systemically significant nonbank financial firm. In order to confer appointment authority on a
26F

27F

28F

29F

30F

25
26

See infra Sections III.A, IV.B.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred
A. Knopf 1945) (1835).
27 See generally Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, State
Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-1032) [hereinafter Big
Spring Second Amended Complaint]. The eleven states are Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia.
28 State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127, 166 (D.D.C. 2013).
29 Final briefs have been filed. Final Opening Brief for the State Appellants, State Nat’l
Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, Nos. 13-5247 & 13-5248 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 2014), ECF No. 45; Final
Opening Brief of Private Plaintiffs–Appellants, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, Nos.
13-5247 & 13-5248 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 2014), ECF No. 47; Final Brief for Appellees, State Nat’l
Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, Nos. 13-5247 & 13-5248 (D.C. Cir. May 9, 2014), ECF No. 44.
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federal judge, and yet prevent the modern-day equivalent of a run on the
bank, the statute prescribes a clandestine process giving the district judge
just twenty-four hours to rule on a petition to appoint a receiver, 30 prohibits
providing any notice of the proceedings to creditors or other interested
third parties, 31 and imposes criminal penalties on anyone who publicly
discloses the pendency of the proceedings. 32 Moreover, the district judge is
permitted to consider only two factual issues under a highly deferential
standard of review in deciding whether to order the liquidation of a major
financial firm. 33 For good measure, the statute proscribes any stay pending
appeal. 34 In effect, the statute seeks to draw on the prestige of the federal
courts in making the appointment of a receiver while depriving parties with
a vital stake in the matter of any notice or meaningful opportunity to be
heard, handcuffing the court from acting in a manner consistent with
judicial authority.
The statute also gives the executive branch broad discretion to subject
some nonbank financial firms to resolution leading to liquidation under
Title II, while letting other firms remain subject to the ordinary bankruptcy
process, including the possibility of reorganization. 35 Allowing the executive
to pick and choose from different resolution regimes for firms in the same
industry based on necessarily subjective determinations of the impact of the
firm’s insolvency on “financial stability in the United States” 36 arguably
violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. 37 And within
the new regime of orderly liquidation, the statute gives a federal agency—
typically the FDIC—wide latitude to depart from the principle that all
creditors of the same class should be treated equally. 38 This too arguably
violates the typical understanding of uniformity in the bankruptcy context.
31F

32F

3F

34F

35F

36F

37F

38F

39F

30
31

Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(v), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(v) (2012).
Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) (stating that the petition
must be filed under seal and hearing is conducted on a strictly confidential basis).
32 Id. § 202(a)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(C).
33 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv).
34 Id. § 202(a)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(B).
35 Id. § 201(a)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 5381(a)(8) (defining a covered financial firm as any firm so
identified by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to the criteria set forth in § 203(b), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5383(b)). For a more extensive discussion of what these criteria entail, see infra text accompanying notes 144-50.
36 Dodd–Frank Act § 203(b)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(4) (2012).
37 The Constitution authorizes Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added).
38 Dodd–Frank Act § 210(b)(4)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (b)(4)(A) (authorizing departure from
equal treatment of similarly situated claimants if the FDIC determines that such action is
“necessary” to maximize the value of the liquidated company’s assets, continue essential operations,
maximize the value of the sale of assets, or minimize losses on the sale of assets).
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The general question addressed by this article is whether the Dodd–Frank
Act’s effort to end the “too big to fail” regime entails an exercise of power
by the executive branch that is too big for the Constitution. We ultimately
conclude that in its current form, the answer is yes. Nevertheless, the
constitutional infirmities could easily have been avoided and hence are
relatively easy to fix.
Ordinary bank receiverships are commenced by an executive appointment
of a receiver, followed by a right of judicial review unlimited as to the issues
that can be raised 39—a process that allows affected interest holders to
challenge the appointment of a receiver after the fact and permits the
reviewing court to function in an appropriate judicial manner. This kind of
ex post judicial review is undoubtedly constitutional in the context of a
statutory regime designed to prevent a financial crisis. In fact, both the
Obama administration’s proposed legislation and the House bill called for a
receiver appointment process closely modeled after the bank receivership
scheme. For reasons not fully explained, however, the Senate rejected this
model and substituted the provisions calling for ex ante judicial appointment
of a receiver. These provisions, coupled with draconian limitations on the
court while making the appointment and the elimination of ex post judicial
review, render the judicial process virtually meaningless. Thus, the constitutional infirmities associated with Title II’s provisions for appointment of a
receiver could be alleviated by simply amending the statute to incorporate
the House provisions for appointing the receiver.
Whether the Dodd–Frank Act’s alleged violations of the uniformity
requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause can be fixed is a harder question.
Title II’s central objective is to provide the government with a new tool to
avoid government bailouts or takeovers of troubled financial firms. It is
debatable if such can be achieved via predictable rules laid down in advance.
However, the loosely written provision that allows the FDIC to depart from
equal treatment of similarly situated creditors 40 could almost certainly have
been drafted more narrowly. Of course, in today’s legislative environment,
obtaining such legislative fixes may be nearly impossible, making it much
more likely that the courts will have to confront these issues.
In Part I, we begin by examining the two statutory models for establishing
the resolution authorities that served as a backdrop to the Dodd–Frank
Act—bank receivership and bankruptcy law—and summarize the ways in
which Dodd–Frank’s Title II deviates from both models. In Part II, we
consider various legal avenues for raising a constitutional challenge to Title II,
40F

41F

39
40

12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(7); see also infra text accompanying notes 55-59.
Dodd–Frank Act § 210(b)(4)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (b)(4)(A).
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each of which is problematic. Part III analyzes the due process and Article
III objections to Title II in greater detail, including possible strategies for
avoiding these difficulties. Part IV turns to the potential constitutional
issues under the Bankruptcy Clause and the First Amendment. Part V lists
some possible takings issues, including an analysis of how the authority to
impair or disregard security interests created prior to the enactment of Title
II might be analyzed under the Takings Clause.
I. TITLE II’S ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY (OLA)
Title II of the Dodd–Frank Act sets forth a new “orderly liquidation
authority” (OLA) designed to serve as a substitute for bankruptcy or
government bailouts of financial firms deemed “too big to fail.” 41 Implicit in
this newly created authority is the notion that the resolution of these large
financial firms’ affairs under ordinary bankruptcy law or other insolvency
laws would threaten the stability of the financial markets. The Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy is the obvious object lesson here. 42 To avoid financial
panic or various contagions analogous to a run on the bank, the statute
assumes that the resolution of these systemically significant firms must
occur rapidly and without any advance public notice. Thus, the process of
appointing a receiver must occur “on a strictly confidential basis” without
any public disclosure, 43 and the judge who makes the appointment must
rule within twenty-four hours. 44 This clandestine process deprives stakeholders of any notice of a process that will lead to the liquidation of a major
financial firm. Moreover, the extremely short deadline renders judicial
oversight essentially meaningless, given the complexity of the matters
involved. These draconian procedures represent a classic example of an
unforced legislative error, for they render the statute vulnerable to constitutional challenge on due process, Article III, and First Amendment grounds.
42F

43F

4F

45F

41
42

Dodd–Frank Act, tit. II, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394.
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 76-77 (2009), available
at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf (“The federal government’s
responses to the impending bankruptcy of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG were
complicated by the lack of a statutory framework for avoiding the disorderly failure of nonbank
financial firms, including affiliates of banks or other insured depository institutions. In the absence
of such a framework, the government’s only avenue to avoid the disorderly failures of Bear Stearns
and AIG was the use of the Federal Reserve’s lending authority. And this mechanism was
insufficient to prevent the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, an event which served to demonstrate
how disruptive the disorderly failure of a nonbank financial firm can be to the financial system and
the economy.”).
43 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).
44 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(v), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(v).
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The OLA process may never be used. It may remain a proverbial “musket
in the closet” that the government holds in reserve while arranging
workouts with creditors or the sale or merger of a troubled firm in lieu of
“orderly liquidation.” 45 If implemented with the consent of the distressed
financial firm, the OLA process may not be contested. The statute specifically
invites the troubled financial firm’s directors to consent to the OLA,
dangling a carrot in front of them in the form of promised immunity from
any shareholder or creditor actions for “acquiescing in or consenting in good
faith to the appointment of the [FDIC] as receiver.” 46 It would take an
intrepid director to battle with the executive branch over the fate of a
financially troubled firm, knowing that any diminution in financial value
attributable to such resistance could be challenged in future litigation by
disgruntled creditors and shareholders, whereas capitulation to the government
would result in the director’s immunity from such lawsuits.
In any event, whether the OLA is used or merely threatened, the
government’s credibility to use the new procedure will depend on whether
relevant actors perceive this authority as constitutional. As we shall see,
there are several features of Title II that give rise to serious questions on
that front.
The basic model for the OLA process is existing law that provides for
administrative receiverships of FDIC-insured banks. 47 Dodd–Frank takes
this bank receivership law and adds to it a number of provisions borrowed
from the Bankruptcy Code, which is essentially a judicially supervised
resolution process. 48 As a result, the OLA is an administrative, rather than a
judicial, resolution process—but one that hews more closely to the substantive
law of bankruptcy than the law governing bank receiverships. Many of the
constitutional issues raised by Title II stem from the unique provisions that
govern the appointment of a receiver under the OLA.49 These provisions do
not follow the template of either bank receivership law or bankruptcy law.
Rather, they were adopted by the Senate during the final days of intense
negotiation over what was to become the final version of the law. Accordingly,
we begin with a brief review of the benchmarks established by bank
46F

47F

48F

49F

50F

45 See SKEEL, supra note 22, at 139-40 (arguing that even though Dodd–Frank’s resolution
rules may violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, they are unlikely to ever be invoked
and are more likely to be used as leverage in negotiations).
46 Dodd–Frank Act § 207, 12 U.S.C. § 5387.
47 SKEEL, supra note 22, at 117-27.
48 See generally Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Dodd–Frank for Bankruptcy Lawyers,
19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 287 (2011).
49 See infra Sections III.A, IV.B.
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receivership and bankruptcy law and then trace these within the evolution
of the Title II provisions by examining Dodd–Frank’s legislative history.
A. Bank Receiverships and Bankruptcy
1. FDIC Receivership Procedure
Under current practice, banks that become financially distressed are
nearly always put into a conservatorship or receivership in which the FDIC
acts as conservator or receiver exercising powers under federal law. 50 It is
theoretically possible for state-chartered banks to have a state-appointed
receiver, but the FDIC can take over a state receivership if the bank has
FDIC-insured deposits, which virtually all banks do. 51 Federal law requires
either that the FDIC be appointed as conservator or receiver by the relevant
bank-supervising agency, such as the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) in the case of a federally chartered bank, 52 or that the
FDIC appoint itself as receiver if the assets of the federal deposit insurance
fund are at risk.53 Once the FDIC assumes control of the bank, the “depository
institution” may commence an action in federal district court seeking an
51F

52F

53F

54F

50 See PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS § 15.01 (Matthew Bender, 2d ed. 2014) (“Closure
can either take the form of an FDIC conservatorship or receivership. The purpose of a conservatorship is to conserve an institution’s assets until it can be sold or restored to viability as a going
concern. The purpose of a receivership, in contrast, is to liquidate an institution or wind up its
affairs. In virtually every case today, the conservator or receiver is the FDIC.”).
51 See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(4)-(5) (2012) (permitting the FDIC to “appoint itself as sole
conservator or receiver of any insured State depository institution” if any of certain enumerated
conditions are met).
52 See id. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii) (“The Corporation shall be appointed receiver, and shall accept
such appointment, whenever a receiver is appointed for the purpose of liquidation or winding up
the affairs of an insured Federal depository institution by the appropriate Federal banking agency,
notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law.”). For any national bank, the decision to
appoint a receiver is determined by the OCC at the discretion of the Comptroller. Id. § 191. The
OCC’s decision to appoint a receiver is generally not subject to judicial review before the
appointment takes effect. See U.S. Sav. Bank v. Morgenthau, 85 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1936)
(holding that “where the Comptroller of the Currency has held a bank to be insolvent and has
appointed a receiver for it, the court will not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the
Comptroller, unless it appears by convincing proof that the Comptroller’s action is plainly
arbitrary, and made in bad faith”).
53 See id. § 1821(c)(4) (providing that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of Federal law,
the law of any State, or the constitution of any State, the Corporation may appoint itself as sole
conservator or receiver of any insured State depository institution,” if the FDIC makes certain
determinations, as described in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(4)(A)-(B), in regards to the financial insufficiency of the insured State depository institution at issue).
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order to dissolve the conservatorship or receivership. 54 The statutes authorizing this form of review generally require that the action be commenced
within thirty days of the appointment of the conservator or receiver. 55 The
review provisions instruct the court either to confirm or dismiss the
appointment of the conservator or receiver “on the merits” and include no
limit on the issues the court may consider or the time the court may take in
rendering its decision. 56 The statute authorizing ex post review of a decision
by the FDIC to appoint a conservator for a federal bank specifies that the
standard of review is whether the OCC’s appointment was “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.” 57 But the other review provisions are silent as to the standard of
review.
Taken as a whole, the statutory language strongly suggests that Congress
contemplated that the district courts would engage in de novo review of any
challenge to the FDIC’s appointment as receiver. The instruction to decide
the matter “on the merits,” the juxtaposition of the arbitrary and capricious
standard for conservatorships with silence about the standard for receiverships, the more serious implications of receiverships—which lead to liquidation
of the bank—and the fact that ordinarily there will be nothing resembling a
formal record compiled by the relevant appointment authority to review all
point to this conclusion. The few courts of appeals that have considered the
matter have nevertheless held that the “arbitrary or capricious” standard of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 58 applies, 59 although some district
courts have disagreed. 60 Whatever the correct standard of review, it is clear
5F

56F

57F

58F

59F

60F

61F

54 Id. § 1821(c)(7) (2012). Parallel provisions authorize judicial review of the OCC’s decision
to appoint the FDIC as receiver of a federally chartered bank, id. § 191(b), review of a decision by
the OCC to appoint the FDIC as conservator of a federally chartered bank, id. § 203(b), and the
appointment of a conservator or receiver for a federally chartered savings association by the
appropriate federal banking agency, id. § 1464(d)(2)(B).
55 An exception is review of a decision by the OCC to appoint the FDIC as conservator,
which must be commenced in twenty days. Id. § 203(b)(1).
56 See id. § 191(b); id. § 203(b); id. § 1464(d)(2)(B); id. § 1821(c)(7).
57 12 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (2012).
58 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
59 See, e.g., Woods v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400, 1406-09 (5th Cir. 1987)
(finding that a provision of the Home Owners’ Loan Act permitting the district court to remove a
receiver appointed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board requires the district court to engage in
only arbitrary and capricious review of the Board’s decision); Guaranty Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed.
Home Loan Bank Bd., 794 F.2d 1339, 1342-43 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that the district court
correctly applied the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard in an action challenging the
appointment by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board of a receiver for a state-chartered, federally
insured savings and loan association).
60 See MCCOY, supra note 50, § 15.04[4] n.1 (citing the “smattering of district court opinions,
which have been rejected by the courts of appeal[s] in other circuits, [that] have interpreted the
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that there is no limitation on the issues that can be presented to the court in
seeking to overturn the appointment of a conservator or receiver, nor is
there any time limitation placed on the court in resolving these issues.
What actually happens in a bank receivership, according to recent
descriptive accounts, is roughly as follows. 61 First, the appropriate state or
federal bank regulatory authority sends the FDIC a “failing bank letter” or
the FDIC determines, based on its own information, that a bank is in
distress. The FDIC then sends a “planning team” to the distressed bank to
make a confidential assessment of its assets and liabilities. Based on this
information, the FDIC develops an appropriate resolution strategy, most
commonly a sale to another bank. 62 The FDIC creates an informational
package about the bank, which it distributes to potential bidders identified
by FDIC staff. Each bidder signs a confidentiality agreement and, if it so
wishes, submits a bid for the bank or its assets. FDIC officials then evaluate
the bids and recommend the lowest cost resolution to the FDIC Board. If
the Board approves, the FDIC is officially appointed as the conservator or
receiver. Such appointments typically occur late on a Friday afternoon.
Over the weekend, the bank is shut down, its books are seized, its locks are
changed, and its signage is modified; a new bank opens for business on
Monday morning. 63 Subsequently, creditors of the failed bank will submit
claims to the FDIC, which the agency resolves, giving priority to secured
creditors and depositors. 64 Any creditor dissatisfied with the FDIC’s
resolution of its claim can bring an action in federal court seeking review of
62F

63F

64F

65F

term ‘upon the merits’ found in statutory provisions for judicial review to authorize a broader
standard of review”).
61 The following summary is drawn from FDIC, THE RESOLUTION HANDBOOK (2003),
available at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook; John L. Douglas & Randall D.
Guynn, supra note 6, at 311-77; Stanley V. Ragalevsky & Sarah J. Ricardi, Anatomy of a Bank Failure,
126 BANKING L.J. 867 (2009); see also David A. Skeel, Jr., The Law and Finance of Bank and
Insurance Insolvency Regulation, 76 TEX. L. REV. 723, 727-31 (1998) (providing a brief overview of
the regulatory framework for the banking and insurance industries).
62 Ragalevsky & Ricardi, supra note 61, at 876. The disposition of a failing bank in this manner
is often referred to as a purchase and assumption transaction (P&A), because the healthy bank
selected by the FDIC agrees to purchase some portion of the failed bank’s assets and assume some
portion of the failed bank’s deposit and other liabilities. Id. at 877. P&A transactions made up
thirty-four of the forty resolutions that were carried out by the FDIC from January 2000 to
August 2008. Id. at 876; see also SKEEL, supra note 22, at 122 (2011) (noting that P&A transactions
are used in fifty-four percent of bank failures).
63 Ragalevsky & Ricardi, supra note 61, at 885.
64 See 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(2)(C)(ii) (2012) (enumerating the subordination hierarchy for a
failed bank’s liabilities).
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the agency’s determination. 65 Such actions are occasionally brought but
rarely successfully. 66
Although judicial review of the decision to commence a receivership is
expressly authorized by statute, 67 it is fair to say that it is “extremely
difficult” to persuade a court to set aside a receivership. 68 Once a receivership
has commenced, courts are highly unlikely to unwind it, because doing so
would require reversing transfers of deposits and assets already completed.
Moreover, it is unclear what, if anything, a bank stands to gain by securing a
judicial order overturning a receivership. The suit would likely generate
publicity about the regulators’ negative assessment of the bank’s financial
condition, causing depositors to flee and potential borrowers to look
elsewhere for loans. As a result, if the bank was not fully insolvent when the
receivership commenced, it likely would be insolvent by the time the court
set aside its receiver determination. Nevertheless, despite being rarely
sought, judicial review is not meaningless. The very existence of the right to
seek judicial review undoubtedly helps ensure that the power to seize banks
will not be abused for illegitimate ends.
In sum, there are several noteworthy points about bank receivership.
First, the process is almost entirely administrative: the FDIC runs the
process from beginning to end. Banks rarely mount a judicial challenge to a
decision to appoint the FDIC as receiver, and courts play only a minor and
episodic role in reviewing the FDIC’s resolution of claims once a receivership
6F

67F

68F

69F

65 See id. § 1815(e)(3)(B) (providing for judicial review and administrative hearings by the
FDIC for review of “the amount of any loss incurred by the [FDIC] in connection with any
insured depository institution,” “the liability of individual commonly controlled depository
institutions for the amount of such loss,” and “the schedule of payments to be made by such
commonly controlled depository institutions”); id. § 1821(d)(6) (providing that a claimant may
request administrative review by the FDIC of a claim or file suit on such a claim in the federal
district court in the district within which the depository institution’s principal place of business is
located).
66 See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, OVERVIEW OF THE FDIC AS CONSERVATOR
OR RECEIVER 6 (2008), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/
092608-Overview-FDICasConvervator-Receiver.pdf (noting that “cases reviewing FDIC actions
as receiver have largely upheld the FDIC’s approaches”); see also SKEEL, supra note 22, at 123 n.8
(citing an email from an FDIC official stating that few creditors seek judicial review of an FDIC
action and that even when judicial review is sought, “changes in the outcome are rare”).
67 See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(7) (granting a failed bank the right to challenge receivership in
federal district court).
68 MCCOY, supra note 50, § 15.04[4]. For examples of courts conducting post-seizure review,
see generally James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1996); McMillian v. FDIC, 81
F.3d 1041 (11th Cir. 1996); DPJ Co. v. FDIC, 30 F.3d 247 (1st Cir. 1994); Haralson v. Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, 837 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1988); FDIC v. Parkway Executive Office Center, Nos. 960121, 96-0122, 1998 WL 18204 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1998); Nashville Lodging Co. v. FDIC, 934 F. Supp.
449 (D.D.C. 1996); Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. FDIC, 857 F. Supp. 976 (D.D.C. 1994).
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is underway. Second, the process proceeds in secret until the moment the
FDIC seizes control of the bank. Bank regulators and the FDIC do not
announce a contemplated receivership, and they do not conduct public
hearings before announcing the seizure. While bank officers and directors
know a receivership is imminent, they understand that it is not in the bank’s
best interest to disclose this information. Potential bidders for bank assets
are subject to confidentiality agreements and communicate with the FDIC
through secure channels so that their involvement remains secret. This
secrecy is justified in that it helps avoid public alarm and a run on deposits,
thereby minimizing government losses on deposit insurance.
2. Bankruptcy Procedure
Bankruptcy is very different from the FDIC’s receivership procedure.
The bankruptcy process is not initiated by a government regulator but
rather by the creditors of a distressed entity or, more commonly, by the
debtor entity itself. 69 For financial firms likely to be subject to Dodd–Frank’s
orderly liquidation, the most likely bankruptcy option would be a petition
seeking reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 70 A
Chapter 11 petition presupposes that the value of keeping the firm in
operation (the going concern value) after restructuring its debts is greater
than a liquidation, the amount that would be obtained by selling off the firm’s
assets and closing its doors. 71 If it turns out that the going concern value is
less than the liquidation value of the firm, the petition will either be
dismissed or converted to a Chapter 7 action during the proceedings. 72
Although the Bankruptcy Code provides that a trustee can be named to
manage the firm during reorganization, the existing management, which has
greater expertise in running the firm, is commonly allowed to remain in
place during reorganization. 73 Creditors are divided into classes, depending
on their relative priority in demanding satisfaction of their claims. 74
70F

71F

72F

73F

74F

75F

69 See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (setting out the petition procedure for voluntary bankruptcy by
the debtor); id. § 303 (setting forth the petition procedure for involuntary bankruptcy of the
debtor by creditors).
70 See generally id. §§ 1101–1174.
71 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434,
452 (1999) (noting that the two recognized policies underlying Chapter 11 are preserving the going
concern of the debtor and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors).
72 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (allowing any party to request conversion from a Chapter 11 case to
a Chapter 7 case for cause, including for continuing loss and the “absence of a reasonable
likelihood of rehabilitation”).
73 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 12 (5th ed. 2010).
74 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2012).
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If creditors are numerous, a creditors’ committee will represent them. 75 The
overall goal of a Chapter 11 filing is to develop a plan of reorganization for
the firm, which may call for the sale of some firm assets and restructuring
the terms of the firm’s debts. 76 The debtor in possession will negotiate with
major creditors or the creditors’ committee to develop a plan that is “fair
and equitable” to each class of claims. 77 Certain consequences flow from
filing any petition for bankruptcy, most importantly the automatic stay of
any collection of debts. 78 While the Bankruptcy Code sets forth deadlines
for certain actions, such as submitting a plan of reorganization, 79 extensions
are commonly obtained in proceedings of any complexity.80
The bankruptcy process is essentially a judicial process. Federal district
courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all bankruptcy cases
governed by title 11 of the U.S. Code. 81 District courts routinely refer
bankruptcy filings to bankruptcy judges, who are considered Article I judges
rather than Article III judges. 82 Bankruptcy judges enjoy significant
independence and resolve contested matters in the same manner as district
court judges, with adversarial public hearings featuring sworn witnesses,
briefs, and written opinions. 83 Nevertheless, bankruptcy courts are regarded
as “adjuncts” to district courts, and district courts have the power to withdraw the reference of cases or proceedings from bankruptcy judges, in whole
76F

7F

78F

79F

80F

81F

82F

83F

84F

75
76

Id. § 1102.
See id. §§ 1121–1129 (outlining procedures for filing a reorganization plan, the contents of
such a plan, and methods for accepting, modifying, and confirming the plan).
77 Id. § 1129(b); see also BAIRD, supra note 73, at 77 (“The ambition of every lawyer whose
client files a Chapter 11 petition is to persuade each group of creditors to consent to a plan of
reorganization.”).
78 Id. § 362.
79 The debtor in possession has the exclusive right to file a plan for 120 days, a deadline
which can be extended. Id. § 1121(b), (d). After that, other parties in interest may file a plan. Id.
§ 1121(c).
80 See id. § 1121(d)(1) (providing that upon request of a party in interest, and pursuant to
notice and hearing, the bankruptcy court may extend the time period for filing a plan of reorganization); see also Novica Petrovski, The Bankruptcy Code, Section 1121: Exclusivity Reloaded, 11 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 451, 453 (“It is also commonly known that bankruptcy courts, almost
routinely, extend the exclusivity period [for filing a plan of reorganization] two or more times after
the first 120 days.”).
81 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2012).
82 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60-61 (1982) (explaining
that “there is no doubt that . . . bankruptcy judges . . . are not Art. III judges” because bankruptcy
judges are appointed for fourteen-year terms, can be removed by the judicial council of the circuit
in which they serve for “incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical and mental
disability,” and do not enjoy salary protection).
83 District courts often have standing reference orders in place that automatically refer all
bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy court. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2012).
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or in part, for good cause. 84 So-called “core” matters that arise under federal
bankruptcy law can be decided by bankruptcy judges, subject to review by
district courts under the appropriate appellate review standard. 85 So-called
“non-core” matters that arise under nonbankruptcy law, such as claims
involving contract and tort law, are subject to de novo review by district
courts. 86 Many provisions of the Code require that such actions can be
taken only after notice and hearing are provided to creditors. 87 Whether
actual notice and hearing are given in any particular instance is governed by
norms derived from the law of due process. 88
In short, bankruptcy is a debt resolution process based predominately on
negotiation and compromise, subject to judicial oversight. Bankruptcy
judges operate much like other federal judges, federal district courts retain
control over key decisions, and appellate review is available to challenge
virtually any judgment. Prominently, bankruptcy is an open process. Of
course, negotiations occur among different classes of creditors behind closed
doors. However, all affected parties are entitled to notice and participation
in critical decisions, such as approval of any reorganization plan. While bank
receivership is essentially an administrative process, subject only to ex post
judicial review, bankruptcy is a party-centered process in which negotiated
solutions are judicially supervised and approved.
85F

86F

87F

8F

89F

84 Id. § 157(d); see also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2603-05 (2011) (summarizing the
division of authority between the district courts and bankruptcy courts under the Bankruptcy
Code).
85 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (granting the district courts jurisdiction to hear appeals of all core
proceedings arising under Title 11); Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2603 (“Parties may appeal final judgments
of a bankruptcy court in core proceedings to the district court, which reviews them under
traditional appellate standards.”).
86 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (permitting a bankruptcy judge to hear a proceeding that is not a
core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under Title 11 but requiring the judge to
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, which in turn must
consider the bankruptcy judge’s proposed findings and conclusions and review de novo any matters
as to which a party has timely and specifically objected). As a matter of constitutional law, “noncore” claims include common law counterclaims and fraudulent conveyance claims, without regard
to how they are designated by statute. See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165,
2172-75 (2014) (allowing common law counterclaims and fraudulent conveyance claims to proceed
as non-core claims, subject to de novo review by the district court).
87 See U.S. BANKR. COURT FOR S. DIST. OF N.Y., GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF
ASSET SALES 2-3 (2013), available at http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/6004-1-jGuidelines.pdf (identifying the procedures for the sale process of the debtor company pursuant to
section 363 of Bankruptcy Code—including notice procedures, protections for the stalking horse
buyer, bidding procedures, the form of the purchase agreement and auction guidelines, and the
approval of the sale to the successful bidder—as matters which must be adjudicated before the
bankruptcy court).
88 See BAIRD, supra note 73, at 7-8.
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B. Legislative History of Dodd–Frank’s OLA
The process of commencing an OLA proceeding under Title II of the
Dodd–Frank Act does not fully conform to either the FDIC banking model
or the bankruptcy model. The Obama administration proposed legislation
on July 22, 2009 (Administration’s Combined Draft) that contained the
initial draft of what was to become Title II. 89 Title XII of this draft, titled
“Enhanced Resolution Authority,” was largely drawn from existing banking
legislation authorizing FDIC receiverships. 90 In keeping with the banking
model, the Administration’s Combined Draft provided for administrative
appointment of a receiver, in this case by the Secretary of the Treasury. 91
The draft also provided for a system of elaborate administrative checks
before making such an appointment. The Federal Reserve Board and the
Board of the FDIC, by a two-thirds vote, were to provide the Secretary
with a “recommendation” as to the nature and extent of actions that should
be taken regarding the bank holding company, and the Secretary was
required to make certain prescribed findings. 92 The required concurrence of
the three administrative bodies, a concept borrowed from FDIC receivership law, was known as the “three keys turning.” 93 The draft also followed
banking law by authorizing the seized firm to file a judicial action within
thirty days, requesting that the receivership be set aside. 94 As under banking
law, the administration’s draft language did not restrict the issues that the
reviewing court was allowed to consider in such a proceeding, nor did it
impose any time limit on the court’s review. The administration was
undoubtedly aware that such a right of review is almost never exercised in
the banking context. Consequently, although a firm’s right to seek judicial
relief would be symbolically important to assure that the new resolution
authority would not be abused, it would have little practical impact on the
resolution process.
90F

91F

92F

93F

94F

95F

89
90
91
92
93

See generally Administration’s Combined Draft, supra note 15.
Id. §§ 1201–1211.
Id. §§ 1203(b), 1204(b).
Id. § 1203(a)-(c).
See SKEEL, supra note 22, at 121 (“The decision whether to put a financial company into
the resolution regime is governed by a process that has become known as ‘three keys turning.’”).
The three agency or “three key” endorsement mechanism first appeared in the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). In order for the FDIC to diverge from
the least-cost resolution rule required under the FDICIA, the Treasury must determine, in
consultation with the President and following a recommendation by a two-thirds vote of the
FDIC and Federal Reserve Board, that such divergence is justified in order to mitigate adverse
effects to the financial stability of the economy as a whole. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2012).
94 Administration’s Combined Draft, supra note 15, § 1205.
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The House version of what became the Dodd–Frank Act, H.R. 4173,
largely tracked the Obama administration’s proposal in terms of appointment
authority. 95 The House bill followed the administration’s draft by providing
for administrative appointment of a receiver by the Secretary of the Treasury
and by prescribing a “three keys turning” procedure before the Secretary
could act. 96 Further, like the administration bill, the House version provided
for a thirty-day period to seek judicial review after the receivership commenced. 97
The Senate had somewhat different ideas. The Senate bill, proposed by
the Democratic leadership in April 2010, followed the House bill in requiring
“three keys turning” before a receiver could be appointed. 98 However, the
Senate bill lodged the appointment authority not in the Secretary of the
Treasury but rather in a panel composed of three bankruptcy judges from
the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, acting on petition by the
Secretary of the Treasury. 99 The discretion of the three-judge panel was,
however, tightly constrained. The panel could consider only a single issue:
whether the Secretary of the Treasury’s determination that the firm was in
default or in danger of default was supported by “substantial evidence.” 100
The only explanation provided by the Senate Report for adding the
bankruptcy judge panel—what might be regarded as a fourth “key turning”—
was that orderly liquidation of nonbank financial firms should be reserved
for truly exceptional cases. 101 The Report stated that “the threshold for
triggering orderly liquidation authority should be very high,” which apparently
provided the rationale for adding “review and determination by a judicial
panel.” 102
One can speculate further as to why the bill’s sponsors selected a panel
of bankruptcy judges for this role. Bankruptcy judges have expertise in
recognizing when firms are in default or in danger of default. Thus, although
not mentioned by the Senate Report, injecting a panel of bankruptcy judges
into the appointment process was presumably aimed at enhancing the
96F

97F

98F

9F

10F

10F

102F

103F

95 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
§§ 1601–1617 (2009).
96 Id. § 1603(a)(1).
97 Id. § 1605.
98 Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 203 (as substituted
Apr. 29, 2010).
99 Id. § 202(a).
100 Id. § 202(b)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv).
101 See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 4 (2010) (explaining that “[t]he orderly liquidation authority
could be used if and only if the failure of the financial company would threaten U.S. financial
stability”).
102 Id.
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legitimacy of what would otherwise be a purely executive branch determination
to liquidate a major nonbank financial firm.
The introduction of this new condition to the orderly liquidation process
nevertheless created a serious practical difficulty relative to the “three keys”
approach advocated by the administration and adopted in the House bill.
The three keys—the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the Treasury—are all
administrative agencies and are conditioned to act in secret, as when
banking regulators and the FDIC move to declare a bank receivership.
Thus, unless there is a leak, the administrative recommendations and
determinations required by the three keys should not trigger a panic in
financial markets or a contagion analogous to a run on the bank. Bankruptcy
judges, in contrast, are accustomed to operating in an open fashion characteristic of American judicial processes. This difference in the conventions of
administrative and judicial actors raised the question of how the “substantial
evidence” review required of the bankruptcy judge panel could be included
in the receivership appointment process without jeopardizing its confidential
nature.
The Senate bill’s answer (although not discussed in the Senate report)
was to impose a series of extraordinary constraints upon the bankruptcy
judge panel. The petition for appointment of a receiver would be filed
under seal 103 and the proceedings before the panel of bankruptcy judges
held “[o]n a strictly confidential basis,” 104 with criminal penalties for
disclosure. 105 Although the subject financial firm would be notified, its
creditors, counterparties, and other stakeholders would be kept in the
dark. 106 The panel would also have to rule very quickly—within twenty-four
hours of receiving the filed petition. 107 The Senate bill did not address what
would happen if the panel failed to make its decision within the requisite
104F

105F

106F

107F

108F

103 Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 202(b)(1)(A)(ii)
(as substituted Apr. 29, 2010).
104 Id. § 202(b)(1)(A)(iii).
105 Id. § 202(b)(1)(C).
106 Id. § 202(b)(1)(A)(iii) (“On a strictly confidential basis, and without any prior public
disclosure, the Panel, after notice to the covered financial company and a hearing in which the
covered financial company may oppose the petition, shall determine, within 24 hours of receipt of
the petition filed by the Secretary, whether the determination of the Secretary that the covered
financial company is in default or in danger of default is supported by substantial evidence.”).
107 Id.
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time period. 108 Once the petition was granted, any stay or injunction
pending appeal to the courts would not be permitted. 109
These provisions are jarring if one thinks of the panel of bankruptcy
judges as operating as a court. However, the constitutional issues presented
by the provisions are diminished by bankruptcy judges’ status as Article I
judges. For constitutional purposes, bankruptcy judges are very similar to
administrative law judges (ALJs) in the executive branch. 110 Thus, the role
of the bankruptcy judge panel under the Senate bill was not significantly
different from a hypothetical provision requiring a panel of Treasury
Department ALJs to determine that there is substantial evidence a firm is in
default or danger of default. 111 Moreover, the Senate provision precluding
any stay of the panel’s order pending appeal is not terribly different from
the judicial review provision under the banking law, which provides for
judicial review only after a receivership has commenced. 112 Allowing an
appeal without a stay is functionally similar to allowing an appeal only after
a receivership has commenced, provided the court has authority to set aside
the receivership.
There was, however, a further important difference in the Senate bill’s
judicial review provisions. The Obama administration’s proposal and the
House bill contained no limitation on the legal or factual issues that could
be presented to the court in an ex post challenge of the appointment of a
receiver. These proposals, like the banking legislation on which they were
modeled, thus allowed the reviewing court virtually unbridled discretion in
the issues it could consider and appeared to contemplate de novo review as
to both fact and law. Under the Senate bill, by contrast, any appeal to the
courts from the determination of the bankruptcy panel would be limited to
whether the Secretary’s determination that the firm was in default or in
109F

10F

1F

12F

13F

108 Id. § 202(b)(1)(A)(iv) (stating merely that the panel’s order authorizing the Secretary of
the Treasury to appoint the FDIC as receiver, or its written statement of reasons it will not issue
such an order, shall be provided to the Secretary “immediately”).
109 Id. § 202(b)(1)(B).
110 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60-61 (1982) (“It is
undisputed that the bankruptcy judges . . . do not enjoy the protections constitutionally afforded
to Art. III judges. The bankruptcy judges do not serve for life subject to their continued ‘good
Behaviour.’ Rather, they are appointed for 14-year terms, and can be removed by the judicial
council of the circuit in which they serve on grounds of ‘incompetency, misconduct, neglect of
duty, or physical or mental disability.’ Second, the salaries of the bankruptcy judges are not
immune from diminution by Congress. In short, there is no doubt that the bankruptcy judges
created by the Act are not Art. III judges.” (citation omitted)).
111 Such a provision, if not subject to review by the Secretary of the Treasury, might
nevertheless give rise to objections under Article II.
112 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(7) (2012) (allowing depository institutions to seek judicial review of
the FDIC’s appointment as receiver but only within thirty days after the appointment).
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danger of default was supported by substantial evidence 113—a far more
restrictive right of judicial review than that provided by the bank receivership
laws. Of course, as we have seen, the right of judicial review is virtually
never exercised in the bank receivership context. Still, a right to judicial
review is an important safeguard, and limiting review to a single factual
question under a deferential standard of review is a much weaker form of
protection against executive abuse than that provided by the banking laws.
Less than a month after the Senate bill was released, Senator Chris
Dodd, the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and the floor
manager of the legislation in the Senate, along with Senator Richard
Shelby—the senior Republican on the Senate Finance Committee, who had
filed a dissenting report to the original Senate bill 114—proposed a series of
amendments to the Senate bill. 115 The first of these amendments changed
the method of appointing a receiver to commence the orderly liquidation
process. Rather than appointment of a receiver by a panel of bankruptcy
judges on petition by the Secretary of the Treasury, the amendment provided
that the receiver would be appointed by the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. 116 For the first time, the receiver was to be
appointed by an Article III judge, not by an executive branch agency or a
panel of Article I judges. The modified Senate bill also changed the standard
of review that the District Court would apply from substantial evidence to
“arbitrary and capricious” and added that the court was to consider whether
the firm satisfied the statutory definition of a “financial company,” as well as
whether the firm was in default or in danger of default. 117 No explanation
for these changes was offered. These amendments were adopted and
incorporated into the final Senate version of the legislation, described as an
amendment in the nature of a substitute of H.R. 4173. 118 The Senate passed
this revised bill on May 20, 2010. 119
14F

15F

16F

17F

18F

19F

120F

113 Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong.
§ 202(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2010).
114 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 231-51 (2010) (providing minority views of Senator Shelby, Senator
Bennett, Senator Bunning, and Senator Vitter).
115 156 CONG. REC. S3139-40 (daily ed. May 5, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Shelby)
(describing the “Dodd–Shelby amendment,” which aimed to “clarif[y] and tighten[] the language
in the bill regarding resolution and the powers of the Fed, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
the Treasury, and others to prevent bailouts”).
116 Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, H.R. 4173 EAS, 111th Cong. § 202
(a)(1)(A)(i) (as substituted in Senate, May 20, 2010).
117 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii). For the Senate’s proposed definition of “financial company,” see id.
§ 201(10).
118 See generally id.
119 156 CONG. REC. S4078 (daily ed. May 20, 2010).
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The public record is silent as to who proposed that the receiver be
appointed by an Article III judge or why this change was thought to be
important. Circumstantial evidence suggests at least one Senator must have
insisted on this unusual form of ex ante review as a condition of his or her
vote. Senator Dodd needed sixty votes to avoid a filibuster. 120 To obtain
sixty votes, Senator Dodd had to secure the support of several shaky
Democrats plus at least two Republicans, including that of the newly elected
Senator from Massachusetts, Scott Brown. 121
When the divergent House and Senate bills went to the Conference
Committee, the House conferees listed as one of their requested changes
the elimination of the Senate’s recently adopted provision for ex ante
judicial review. 122 The Senate refused, without explanation. 123 The House
again insisted on the change, 124 but the Senate refused to relent. 125 At that
point, the House capitulated. A plausible inference is that the Senate
conferees believed they could not abandon the provision for judicial
appointment authority without endangering the razor-thin margin needed
for sixty votes to approve the legislation. Regardless, the Senate version,
calling for appointment of the FDIC as receiver by an Article III court, was
12F

12F

123F

124F

125F

126F

120 See ROBERT G. KAISER, ACT OF CONGRESS: HOW AMERICA’S ESSENTIAL INSTITUTION
WORKS AND HOW IT DOESN’T 278 (2013) (commenting that the Senate of the 111th Congress
(2009-2010) “began to operate on the assumption that nothing contentious could win approval
without a supermajority of sixty votes, a new impediment to legislative action”).
121 Id. at 267-328; see also GEITHNER, supra note 9, at 416-24; Jia Lynn Yang, A Key Republican
Vote Keeps Banking Curbs In Play, WASH. POST, June 23, 2010, at A12 (noting that Senator Brown
was likely to get the concessions he demanded, because his vote was critical for approval of the
House–Senate draft).
122 STAFF OF H. FIN. SERVS. SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC MONETARY POLICY & TECH.,
111TH CONG., HOUSE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO TITLE II (Comm. Print June 16, 2010),
available at http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/FinancialSvcsDemMedia/file/key_issues/
Financial_Regulatory_Reform/TITLEII_OFFER.pdf.
123 STAFF OF H. FIN. SERVS. SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC MONETARY POLICY & TECH.,
111TH CONG., HOUSE COUNTEROFFER (Comm. Print June 23, 2010), available at http://
democrats.financialservices.house.gov/FinancialSvcsDemMedia/file/key_issues/Financial_Regulatory_
Reform/Conference_on_HR_4137/Title_II/Title_II_House_Counteroffer_6_23_2010.pdf (stating that
“THE HOUSE INSISTS ON ITS ORIGINAL OFFER”).
124 Id. (stating that “[t]he Senate . . . [d]oes not accept the House offer to replace the ex ante
judicial review process with an ex post judicial review process”).
125 STAFF OF THE S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, 111TH CONG.,
REVISED SENATE COUNTEROFFER (Comm. Print June 24, 2010), available at
http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/FinancialSvcsDemMedia/file/key_issues/Financial_
Regulatory_Reform/Conference_on_HR_4137/Title_II/Senate_Title_II_Counteroffer_Revised_
6_24.pdf
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approved by the Conference Committee, adopted by both the House and
Senate, and signed by the President. 126
127F

C. OLA as Enacted
The relevant provisions of Title II, as enacted, can be briefly summarized. The process preceding a petition to the District Court for the District
of Columbia for appointment of a receiver is described as a “systemic risk
determination” by the statute. 127 A systemic risk determination requires the
Department of the Treasury to establish that the conditions warranting
orderly liquidation have been met, as specified through seven affirmative
findings:
1. The financial company must be in default or in danger of default; 128
2. The failure of the financial company would have serious adverse
effects on financial stability in the United States; 129
3. No viable private sector alternative is available to prevent default; 130
4. Any effect of a receivership on creditors, counterparties, and shareholders
would be “appropriate” given the benefits of a receivership in terms
of preserving financial stability; 131
5. Establishing a receivership would avoid or mitigate the adverse effects
on stakeholders relative to not undertaking such action; 132
6. The company has been ordered by regulators to convert all of its
convertible debt instruments; 133 and
7. The company satisfies the definition of a financial company. 134
128F

129F

130F

13F

132F

13F

134F

135F

126 H.R. REP. NO. 111-517 (2010) (Conf. Rep.); see also Remarks on Signing the Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 617 ( July 21,
2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201000617/pdf/DCPD-201000617.pdf.
127 Dodd–Frank Act § 203, 12 U.S.C. § 5383 (2012).
128 Id. § 203(b)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(1).
129 Id. § 203(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(2).
130 Id. § 203(b)(3), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(3).
131 Id. § 203(b)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(4).
132 Id. § 203(b)(5), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(5).
133 Id. § 203(b)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(6).
134 Id. § 203(b)(7), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(7). There are four categories of financial companies
subject to the Title II orderly liquidation authority under Dodd–Frank:

1. Bank holding companies, id. § 102(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(1); id. § 201(a)(11)(B)(i), 12
U.S.C. § 5381(a)(11)(B)(i); id. § 203(a)(1)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(1)(A);
2. Nonbank financial companies having at least eighty-five percent of their gross revenue or
consolidated assets derived from activities that are financial in nature or incidental to
financial activity, including the ownership or control of one or more insured depository
institutions, id. § 102(a)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(4); id. § 201(a)(11)(B)(ii)-(iii), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5381(a)(11)(B)(ii)-(iii); id. § 203(a)(1)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(1)(A);
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The statute also adopts the three keys turning approach that initially
appeared in the Administration’s Combined Draft, meaning that the
Secretary of the Treasury must obtain the written recommendation,
supported by a two-thirds vote, of the members of both the Federal Reserve
Board and the FDIC. 135 In addition, the statute requires the Secretary to
consult with the President before filing a petition. 136
The statute does not establish any right to participate in this administrative
process, although the Treasury could promulgate regulations providing
affected private interests with notice and an opportunity to be heard before
appointment of a receiver. 137 But the assumed need for secrecy would seem
to preclude granting any such rights, and there is no indication that the
Treasury has contemplated such regulations. However, the statute does
require the Secretary to notify the covered financial company when making
the determination to file a petition, and there could be a gap in time
between the Secretary’s notification of the “determination” and the filing of
the petition in court. 138 This would give the financial company some time to
prepare for the court proceedings. But again, the statute does not require
136F

137F

138F

139F

3. Subsidiaries of the financial companies identified in the first two categories, except for
those subsidiaries that otherwise qualify as insured depository institutions or insurance
companies, id. § 201(a)(11)(B)(iv), 12 U.S.C. § 5381(a)(11)(B)(iv); id. § 203(a)(1)(A), 12
U.S.C. § 5383(a)(1)(A); and
4. Entities that qualify as brokers and dealers and are accordingly registered with the SEC
and members of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, id. § 201(a)(7), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5381(a)(7); id. § 203(a)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(1)(B).
135 Id. § 203(a)(1)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(1)(A). Different administrative entities must provide written recommendations if the covered financial firm is a broker/dealer or an insurance
company. Id. § 203(a)(1)(B)-(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(1)(B)-(C).
136 Id. § 203(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b).
137 The FDIC’s regulations implementing Title II do not address the process leading up to
appointment of a receiver. See generally Orderly Liquidation Authority, 12 C.F.R. §§ 380.1–.53
(2014). To date, the Department of the Treasury has not promulgated any regulations regarding
how notice of its receivership determination must be provided to the failing financial company,
much less whether such notice must also be provided to affiliated parties with significant interests
at stake. While the possibility of some future regulation along these lines is not out of the
question, given the Treasury’s objection to the forty-eight hours’ advance notice requirement for
any receivership petition to the D.C. District Court (a requirement contained in the originally
issued Local Civil Rule 85), any rule regarding the provision of advance notice to anyone
implicated by the Treasury’s receivership decision certainly seems unlikely. See U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-735, BANKRUPTCY: AGENCIES CONTINUE RULEMAKINGS
FOR CLARIFYING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY 15-16 (2012)
(reporting that the Treasury Department objected to requirements in the original D.C. District
Court Local Civil Rule 85 that it provide an additional forty-eight hours’ notice before filing a
petition to invoke OLA and, as a result, the court revised the final rule to add the language “to the
extent feasible”).
138 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
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that the notification of the determination occur before filing of the petition,
and the concern for swift, secret action would work against giving the
covered firm any realistic amount of time to prepare to do battle in court.
Once the executive branch decides that a financial firm should be placed
in receivership, it files a petition for appointment of a receiver under seal
with the District Court for the District of Columbia. 139 The statute provides
for stiff criminal penalties for anyone who “recklessly” discloses a determination to file a petition, the content of the petition, or “the pendency of
court proceedings.” 140 Creditors and other stakeholders receive no notice
and have no statutory way of intervening to defend their interests. If the
court does not rule on the petition within twenty-four hours, it is automatically
granted. 141 A covered financial firm will thus be given a mere twenty-four
hours’ notice that the Treasury wants it liquidated, during which time the
firm and its attorneys must review the Treasury’s petition and findings,
prepare a rebuttal and file it with the court, and persuade the court, in a
hastily convened hearing, to reject the petition. 142
The statute also severely limits what issues the court can consider. The
court is permitted to consider only the Secretary’s determinations that the
firm is a “financial company,” as defined by the Act, and that the firm is “in
default or in danger of default.” 143 Moreover, the court may consider only
whether these two determinations are “arbitrary and capricious.” 144 The
statute provides that if the District Court finds either of the Secretary’s
determinations to be arbitrary and capricious, the court must remand to the
Secretary and afford the Secretary “an immediate opportunity to amend and
refile the petition.” 145 No other relief is mentioned, implying that the Secretary
can continue to refile until the District Court finally grants the petition.
The firm may appeal the District Court’s findings within thirty days to
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and petition for a
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court within thirty days of the circuit
140F

14F

142F

143F

14F

145F

146F

139
140
141
142

Id.
Id. § 202(a)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(C).
Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(v), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(v).
The statute directs the District Court for the District of Columbia to adopt rules implementing the provisions for appointment of a receiver. Id. § 202(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(b). They were
adopted by Local Civil Rule 85 on July 6, 2011. D.D.C. CIV. R. 85; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-735, BANKRUPTCY: AGENCIES CONTINUE RULEMAKINGS FOR
CLARIFYING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY 15-16 (2012). For
further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 275-276.
143 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii).
144 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iv)(I)-(II), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv)(I)-(II).
145 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iv)(II), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv)(II).
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court’s ruling. 146 But no stay is allowed pending appeal, so the receivership
moves forward once the petition is granted, even if the firm appeals. 147 The
statute again limits the issues that can be considered by the court of appeals
and the Supreme Court; like the district court, these appellate courts may
only inquire about whether the findings that the firm is a covered financial
firm and is in default or in danger of default are “arbitrary and capricious.” 148 Indeed, the language of the statute is emphatic in limiting the
issues that may be considered on appeal, stating that review “shall be
limited” to these two issues. 149 It is not clear what relief the D.C. Circuit
and the Supreme Court can grant if they conclude that one or both of the
reviewable determinations is arbitrary and capricious. Since the only relief
the district court can provide is a remand, arguably the only relief available
from the appellate courts would be a remand to the district court with
instructions to remand to the Secretary for more detailed findings.
Once the district court grants the petition appointing the FDIC as
receiver of the covered financial firm, the process moves out into the open.
The statute describes in excruciating detail a special kind of receivership
that in some respects resembles an FDIC receivership of a bank and in
other respects resembles ordinary bankruptcy, with the FDIC exercising
most of the powers of a debtor in possession or trustee in bankruptcy. 150
After its appointment, the FDIC as receiver exercises all the powers of the
financial firm, including the power to oversee the firm’s daily operations,
hire and fire employees, and retain the services of third-party vendors. 151
But the FDIC also has powers resembling those of a bankruptcy court,
including the powers to order a stay of further proceedings to collect debts
against the covered financial firm, 152 unwind fraudulent and preferential
transactions, 153 bring actions to collect monies owed to the firm, 154 and
consider and resolve claims of various classes of creditors against the firm. 155
It is important to note that any creditor dissatisfied with the FDIC’s
resolution of a “claim” can bring a judicial action in the United States
District Court where the covered financial firm has its principal place of
147F

148F

149F

150F

15F

152F

153F

154F

15F

156F

146
147
148
149
150

Id. § 202(a)(2)(A)(i), (B)(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(2)(A)(i), (B)(i).
Id. § 202(a)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 202(a)(2)(A)(iv), (B)(iv), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(2)(A)(iv), (B)(iv).
Id.
See generally Baird & Morrison, supra note 48 (highlighting the core congruities between
the OLA under the Dodd–Frank Act and the Bankruptcy Code).
151 Dodd–Frank Act § 210(a)(1)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(A).
152 Id. § 210(a)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(B).
153 Id. § 210(a)(11)(A)-(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(11)(A)-(B).
154 Id. § 210(a)(1)(B)(ii), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(B)(ii).
155 Id. § 210(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(2).
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business, and the court will rule on the claim. 156 A “claim” is “any right to
payment.” 157 Thus, insofar as the interests implicated by orderly resolution
under Title II can be reduced to monetary claims against the firm in
receivership, the statute affords an opportunity for the claimant to have her
day in court. As adopted, however, Title II requires that every firm be
liquidated, 158 that stockholder equity be wiped out before creditor claims are
compromised, 159 that creditors are entitled to no more than they would have
received in a liquidation in bankruptcy, 160 that all officers and directors
responsible for the financial collapse be dismissed,161 and that the compensation
received by such officers within two years of the receivership be clawed
back. 162 Because these consequences are mandated by law once a receiver is
appointed, the only possible avenue for challenging them is to challenge the
appointment of the receiver. And, as described above, the provisions for
making such a challenge are so severely limited that they are meaningless.
Some decisions, such as a determination that an officer was “responsible”
and hence must be dismissed, could conceivably be challenged by filing a
claim for backpay with the receiver, and, upon denial of this claim, challenging
the denial of the claim in court. But, under the Dodd–Frank Act, there is no
mechanism to seek review of the decision to strip an officer or director of
his or her position before dismissal. 163 Nor is there any provision for court
approval of other significant actions by the FDIC, such as the creation of a
bridge financial company, 164 the sale of assets, 165 or the final liquidation of
the covered firm. 166 In its current form, the Dodd–Frank Act includes no
provision that would allow any of these decisions to be reviewed by any
court.
157F

158F

159F

160F

16F

162F

163F

164F

165F

16F

167F

156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id. § 210(a)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(4).
Id. § 201(a)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5381(a)(4).
Id. § 214(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5394(a).
Id. § 206(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5386(2) (2012).
Id. § 210(d)(2)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(d)(2)(B).
Id. § 206(4)-(5), 12 U.S.C. § 5386(4)-(5).
Id. § 210(s), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(s).
See id. § 206(5), 12 U.S.C. § 5386(5) (the FDIC is required to “ensure that the members
of the board of directors (or body performing similar functions) responsible for the failed
condition of the covered financial company are removed, if such members have not already been
removed at the time the Corporation is appointed as receiver”); see also id. § 210(e), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5390(e) (stating that “no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or
functions of the receiver”).
164 Id. § 210(a)(1)(D), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(D).
165 Id.
166 Id.
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES: THE WHO AND THE WHEN
A variety of potential constitutional challenges could be made to Title
II. The secret, twenty-four hour proceeding in which the FDIC is appointed
receiver by the District Court of the District of Columbia could be challenged
for violating due process or Article III. The scheme could also be challenged
for violating the “uniformity” requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause or the
First Amendment. One could also imagine challenges under the Takings
Clause, depending on how certain issues are resolved during the receivership.
But we must first consider who can bring these sorts of constitutional claims
and when they might be advanced.
We will discuss three possibilities: (1) raising constitutional claims
defensively in the district court in response to the petition by the Secretary
of the Treasury asking for appointment of a receiver; (2) filing an independent
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to enjoin the receivership once it is approved
(but before it has taken significant steps to unwind the firm); and (3) filing
an action to enjoin the appointment of a receiver before the Secretary files a
petition to appoint a receiver. The last option is the avenue being pursued
by the state attorneys general in the pending Big Spring litigation. 167
168F

A. Raising Claims by Defense
Ordinarily, raising constitutional claims defensively would be the least
problematic course of action. If the government files a legal action demanding
the defendant’s person or property, there is no doubt the defendant can
raise any constitutional objections he or she may have by way of defense. 168
Standing is clearly established: concrete injury has either occurred or is
“certainly impending.” 169 Jurisdiction is based on the authority invoked by
169F

170F

167
168

Big Spring Second Amended Complaint, supra note 27.
See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1372 (1953) (“Perhaps a plaintiff does have to take
what Congress gives him or doesn’t give him [by way of jurisdiction] . . . . But surely not a
defendant. It’s only a limitation on what a court can do once it has jurisdiction, not a denial of
jurisdiction, that can hurt a defendant. And if the court thinks the limitation is invalid, it’s always
in a position to say so, and either to ignore it or let the defendant go free.”).
169 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (citation omitted); see also
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983) (“[W]hen an individual who is the very object of a law’s
requirement or prohibition seeks to challenge it, he always has standing.”).
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the government in bringing its action. 170 There is no need to demonstrate a
cause of action, since the defendant is acting defensively.
The government might argue that raising constitutional defenses is
implicitly precluded by statute. Specifically, by limiting review to whether
the Secretary’s two determinations are arbitrary and capricious, the Dodd–
Frank Act implicitly precludes consideration of other issues. Given the
established canon that implied preclusion of review of constitutional
questions is disfavored, however, it is difficult to see how this would succeed.
It is well established that Congress must speak with clarity before it cuts off
constitutional claims, and the Court has said a “serious constitutional question” would be presented if such a clear statement of preclusion were ever
encountered. 171 Nothing in Title II comes close to a clear statement precluding constitutional defenses. 172 Thus, if and when the Secretary of the
Treasury files a petition in the District Court for the District of Columbia
asking for the appointment of a receiver to liquidate a financial firm, the
firm (and possibly its officers or directors) can raise constitutional defenses
in response to the petition.
The peculiar procedures set forth in Title II greatly complicate this
conventional approach. One problem is notice. Some stakeholders—namely,
the directors and principal officers of the firm targeted for receivership and
liquidation—will know about the Secretary’s petition. But other stakeholders—
including creditors, counterparties, most employees of the firm, and the
shareholders of the firm—cannot raise constitutional objections defensively,
because Dodd–Frank makes no provision for giving them notice, requires
that the court proceedings be conducted “on a strictly confidential basis,” 173
and indeed makes it a criminal offense for anyone who is aware of the
proceeding to give notice to any third party. 174 If there is no legal way to
obtain notice of adverse action by the government, one cannot defend
17F

172F

173F

174F

175F

170 See 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2012) (providing the district courts with original jurisdiction in “all
civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer
thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress”).
171 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74
(1974) (holding that there must be clear and convincing evidence of congressional intent in order
for a statute to permissibly restrict access to judicial review).
172 Various provisions of the Act address questions of judicial review, but these provisions all
cut off judicial proceedings asserting most claims against the firm while it is in receivership or
most actions against the FDIC in its capacity as receiver. Dodd–Frank Act § 210(a)(9)(D), 12
U.S.C. § 5390(a)(9)(D) (2012). These provisions do not address review of the Secretary’s decision
to seek appointment of a receiver nor do they address possible constitutional challenges to the Act
or any of its provisions.
173 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii).
174 Id. § 202(a)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(C).
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against it on constitutional or any other grounds. It is equally problematic
that the district court cannot conceivably give adequate consideration to a
constitutional defense in only twenty-four hours. The Secretary will insist
that the statute requires adhering to the twenty-four-hour deadline, at
which point the petition is deemed automatically granted and no stay is
possible. 175 Further, the Secretary would likely claim that urgent action is
necessary to avert financial crisis. Faced with a conflict between a strict
statutory deadline and government warnings of financial crisis, on the one
hand, and the court’s duty to enforce the Constitution, on the other, what is
the court going to do?
The court could resolve the conflict by invoking the Constitution as
authority to make modest modifications to the statutory procedures. 176 For
example, the court might grant a temporary stay of further action on the
petition to afford an adequate period of time to brief and consider the
constitutional issues presented. After all, at this point the proceedings are
confidential and the papers have been filed under seal. 177 If the court is
persuaded that the constitutional defenses are serious, it might grant a short
stay, perhaps of a few days, to give the issues full consideration. If, after this
period of expedited consideration, the court concludes that the statute is
unconstitutional in one or more respects, it could order permanent injunctive
relief that cures the constitutional defect and allows the court to consider
the petition in a manner consistent with constitutional requirements. 178
This constitutional ruling would, of course, be subject to appeal by the
government (which could request a stay or emergency relief ) under the
ordinary rules of appellate procedure.
This solution is problematic, however, because it requires the court
to effectively rewrite the statute before deciding its constitutionality. This
176F

17F

178F

179F

175
176

Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(v), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(v).
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258-60 (2005) (removing two provisions from
the Federal Sentencing Act that made the federal sentencing guidelines mandatory and hence
unconstitutional rather than invalidating the legislation in its entirety); see also United States v.
Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1198-1202 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (requiring post-indictment hearing
procedures for any finding of probable cause in connection with a restraint on pretrial disposition
of assets); Lee v. Thornton, 538 F.2d 27, 32-33 (2d Cir. 1976) (declaring a federal provision
allowing for seizure of vehicles for customs violations unconstitutional for lack of procedural due
process and remedying the infirmity by requiring action on petitions for mitigation or remission
within twenty-four hours and a probable cause hearing within seventy-two hours).
177 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii).
178 An issue of severability would be presented, at least implicitly. But it seems unlikely that
the entire Dodd–Frank Act should fall on constitutional grounds due to a few constitutional
infirmities in the process for appointing a receiver.
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fix also does nothing to provide notice to other stakeholders who may wish
to raise constitutional objections.
B. Enjoining the Receiver
A second possible approach is for any stakeholder aggrieved by the
appointment of a receiver and pending liquidation of the firm to file an
independent action in the district court seeking to enjoin the receivership
on constitutional grounds. Jurisdiction would be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
which applies to actions grounded in the Constitution. 179 Standing would be
established by the prospective liquidation of the firm, loss of rights, or loss
of claims having monetary value. 180 The cause of action could be based on
the APA, which provides that “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute
and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court
are subject to judicial review.” 181 The Secretary’s decision to petition for a
receivership would be considered final agency action, and Dodd–Frank’s
draconian twenty-four-hour time limit and requirement that judicial
proceedings remain in camera would preclude the Act from affording “an
adequate remedy in court.” 182 The virtue of this approach is that the suit
would be filed immediately after establishing the receivership, so the
automatic stay powers given to the receiver would be in effect, temporarily
stabilizing the situation and hopefully forestalling financial panic analogous
to a run on the bank.
Unfortunately, Dodd–Frank appears to eliminate this option, at least for
some constitutional claims: “Except as provided in this title, no court may
take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of
the receiver hereunder, and any remedy against the Corporation or receiver
shall be limited to money damages determined in accordance with this
title.” 183 This provision seems to preclude any action to “restrain or affect”
the receiver based on constitutional claims in an action brought under 28
U.S.C. § 1331. 184 Thus, for example, no court could entertain an action to
180F

18F

182F

183F

184F

185F

179 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (providing that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution”).
180 Any claimant who is “likely to suffer economic injury as a result of an agency action
satisfies” the requirement of injury in fact. 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 16.4, at 1416 (5th ed. 2010).
181 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
182 Id.
183 Dodd–Frank Act § 210(e), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(e) (2012).
184 Id. The courts of appeals have interpreted other financial statutes with nearly identical
wording as precluding claims based on the APA or violations of federal statutory law. See, e.g.,
Cnty. of Sonoma v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 710 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the
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enjoin the receiver on the ground that the statute violates the uniformity
requirement of the Bankruptcy Power or the just compensation requirement
of the Takings Clause. This preclusion of review, however, might not apply
to constitutional claims—including those based on Article III, the First
Amendment, or due process—concerning the initial proceeding in the
district court to appoint a receiver. Such claims challenge the judicial
process to appoint the receiver and so do not seek to “restrain or affect” the
powers of the receiver once appointed. 185
186F

C. Suit for Anticipatory Relief
The third option is to file an action challenging the constitutionality of
the Act before the Secretary files a petition to appoint a receiver. Here,
standing likely would be the most serious problem, particularly if the firm
or the stakeholder bringing the action cannot demonstrate that action by the
government is threatened or “certainly impending.” 186 It would likely be
187F

Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which substantially limits judicial review of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency’s actions as conservator, barred the court from taking jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims, so long as the directive being challenged was a lawful exercise of
the Agency’s power as conservator); Town of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 699 F.3d 221,
227-28 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a statute that empowers the Federal Housing Finance Agency,
as conservator for the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), to take necessary actions to put those
regulated entities in sound and solvent condition and which limits judicial review of the Agency’s
exercise of actions as conservator, did not authorize judicial review of FHFA’s issuance of a
directive that caused Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to stop purchasing mortgages secured by
properties subject to priority lien obligations under local governments’ first-lien Property Assessed
Clean Energy programs); Freeman v. FDIC, 56 F.3d 1394, 1399-1400 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding
that a provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act prohibited
the court from restraining the powers of the FDIC and thus the court could not grant relief to
prevent the FDIC from foreclosing on plaintiffs–debtors’ residences, which served as collateral for
notes held by a failed bank for which the FDIC was receiver). The only apparent exception,
recognized in dicta, is if the agency acts “beyond, or contrary to, its statutorily prescribed,
constitutionally permitted, powers or functions.” Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres. v. FDIC, 995 F.2d
238, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Sharpe v. FDIC, 126 F.3d 1147, 1155 (9th Cir. 1997).
185 As for defects in the appointment process, one might also file a motion under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to set aside the final judgment approving the receiver on the ground
that the judgment was obtained under procedures that violate the Constitution. FED. R. CIV. P.
60(b). The Rule 60(b) motion would not be governed by Dodd–Frank’s time limits or gag order
and hence would not encounter the problems that doom any constitutional defense raised in
response to the petition itself. Still, even if a Rule 60(b) motion works for claims directed to the
judicial process for appointing a receiver, it would not work for other constitutional objections to
Title II.
186 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (citation omitted). In the case
of the stakeholders, standing may be even more difficult to establish. See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (“[W]hen the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government
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necessary to demonstrate that the government is seriously contemplating
using the OLA to appoint a receiver, but such a showing will be difficult if
the government is successful in keeping its internal deliberations secret.
Do the state attorneys general in the Big Spring litigation stand on firmer
footing in mounting a challenge to Title II before it has been applied to any
particular firm? Arguably, they do. Although the Supreme Court has
rejected state standing to challenge the constitutionality of federal legislation on behalf of its citizens through parens patriae suits, 187 recent decisions
suggest growing liberality toward state standing. For example, in
Massachusetts v. EPA, where Massachusetts sought to challenge the federal
government’s failure to regulate global warming, the Supreme Court, in
determining the State’s standing to sue, spoke mysteriously about states
enjoying “special solicitude” relative to private parties. 188 More recently, in
the Affordable Care Act litigation, serious questions were raised about state
standing, with the Fourth Circuit ruling that Virginia lacked standing to
challenge the individual mandate. 189 The Supreme Court declined to review
this ruling 190 and, in a separate case, went on to consider a wide-ranging
challenge to the individual mandate brought by twenty-six States, as well as
several other plaintiffs, without uttering a word about the States’ standing.191
This, of course, does not mean the Court found that the States had standing.
There were other plaintiffs in the case, including private individuals, and
the Court may have implicitly concluded these individuals had standing to
challenge the mandate. Nevertheless, the Affordable Care Act case may lend
further support to the idea that state standing is to be liberally construed.
The attorneys general lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Title
II of Dodd–Frank rests on the States’ interest in their employee pension
funds, which include investments in firms that are potentially eligible for
liquidation under Title II. 192 Although none of these firms is currently
threatened with orderly resolution under Dodd–Frank, the States argue that
the Act has taken away their federal statutory right to have their interests as
18F

189F

190F

19F

192F

193F

action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more
difficult’ to establish.” (citation omitted)).
187 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923) (finding that a state cannot
institute judicial proceedings as parens patriae to protect its citizens, who are also citizens of the
United States, from the operation of a federal statute, because the federal government, not the
state, represents those citizens as parens patriae).
188 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
189 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 272 (4th Cir. 2011).
190 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 59 (2012) (denying petition for writ of
certiorari).
191 See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
192 See generally Big Spring Second Amended Complaint, supra note 27.
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creditors treated the same as other similarly situated creditors. 193 They
claim that the abrogation of their rights is a present invasion of a legally
protected interest and hence satisfies the Article III requirement of actual
immediate injury. 194 The right to equal treatment of creditors under the
Bankruptcy Code, however, is one that comes into play only when a debtor
is bankrupt. If the mere existence of a debt were enough to confer standing
to challenge a change in the legal treatment of creditors, then any person
would be able to challenge any change in the law that might conceivably
affect their interests as creditors sometime in the future. This is clearly not
the law. 195 Also, an injury caused by Dodd–Frank’s authorization of departures from equal treatment of similarly situated creditors bears no causal
relationship to Article III, First Amendment, or due process objections to
the Act. 196 Thus, it is not clear that this alleged injury, even if otherwise
sufficient to confer standing, would support standing to challenge the OLA’s
constitutionality prior to the actual commencement of an OLA receivership.
Therefore, we are inclined to agree with the District Court that the States’
suit is premature, 197 and we anticipate that the D.C. Circuit will agree as
well, at least in the absence of further evidence that a particular invocation
of the OLA would affect the States’ financial interests.
Finding a cause of action could also be problematic. The APA, to repeat,
provides that “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to
judicial review.” 198 If the Secretary of the Treasury has not yet made a
determination to file a petition, it would be difficult to claim that there is a
final agency action to review. Absent a cause of action under the APA, the
cause of action would have to be implied directly from the Constitution.
194F

195F

196F

197F

198F

19F

193 State Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the
Second Amended Complaint at 16-19, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127
(D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-1032).
194 Id. at 19-24.
195 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009) (noting that allegations
that an injury may occur “some day” without “any specification of when that some day will be” do
not satisfy the imminent injury requirement for standing (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1992) (stating that a plaintiff does
not state an Article III case or controversy when he “rais[es] only a generally available grievance
about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of
the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than
it does the public at large”).
196 It is not clear that this provision of Dodd–Frank even implicates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause if it is interpreted to require that debtors be treated uniformly, as
opposed to creditors. See infra Section IV.A.
197 State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127, 141-46 (D.D.C. 2013).
198 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (emphasis added).
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Specifically, it would be necessary to bring an Ex parte Young–style action
seeking to enjoin federal officers, including the Secretary of the Treasury,
from threatening action alleged to violate the Constitution. 199 Although
there is controversy about the rationale and scope of actions based on Ex
parte Young, 200 the decision is firmly established in federal jurisprudence as a
means of securing equitable relief for violations of the Constitution, and
presumably it remains a valid fallback when the APA does not apply. 201
If the standing obstacle can be overcome, an Ex parte Young–style action
might be the best of the three options. The action would not be subject to
Dodd–Frank’s time limits or notice prohibitions, which only come into play
after the petition is filed. Nor would the action be limited by the preclusion
of actions that seek to “restrain or affect” the powers of the receiver, because
the receiver would not have been appointed.
20F

201F

20F

D. The Tucker Act Defense
Whichever option is chosen, the government would likely seek to defeat
any request for injunctive or declaratory relief on the ground that the firm
and its stakeholders will suffer no irreparable injury if the constitutional
arguments are postponed until after the OLA process is complete. A likely
doctrinal vehicle for advancing this defense would be the Tucker Act 202 and
the accompanying proposition that takings claims should not be adjudicated
by a court of general jurisdiction, provided that all the interests at stake can
be fully protected by a suit for just compensation in the Court of Federal
Claims under the Tucker Act. 203 Dodd–Frank contains language that cuts
203F

204F

199 See generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (allowing suits for prospective injunctive
relief against officials acting on behalf of a state government to proceed in the federal courts,
despite the state’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, when those state officials
act unconstitutionally).
200 See David L. Shapiro, Ex Parte Young and the Uses of History, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 69, 70 (2011) (remarking that “the range of justifications for the result [in Ex parte Young], and
the analyses of its implications, are almost as diverse as the ethnic makeup of a typical subway car
on a New York City 1 train”).
201 See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (reaffirming that,
under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, “a court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into
whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly
characterized as prospective’” (citation omitted)).
202 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012) (providing that “[t]he United States Court of Federal Claims
shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon
any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages
in cases not sounding in tort”).
203 See Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 13 (1990) (finding that “the
Tucker Act is an ‘implie[d] promis[e]’ to pay just compensation which individual laws need not
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off any remedy against the FDIC as receiver, except an action for money
damages as authorized by Title II. 204 But the Tucker Act authorizes suits
against the United States for takings or breach of contract, and Dodd–Frank
does not specifically disclaim such a remedy.
Whether such a “no irreparable harm” argument would succeed is
uncertain. The Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the Tucker
Act is that the Act’s remedy is not exclusive and may be displaced entirely if
another applicable statute supplies a “comprehensive remedial scheme.” 205
Dodd–Frank certainly seems to fit this description. Thus maybe even a
takings claim could be raised in an anticipatory challenge to the constitutionality of Dodd–Frank’s Title II, at least by way of declaratory judgment.
If the court finds that the receivership resulted in a taking, then the
aggrieved party could bring a suit for just compensation in the Court of
Federal Claims. 206
The government would likely seek to bolster its “no irreparable harm”
argument by claiming that the interests at stake are exclusively monetary
claims and that such interests, by their very nature, can be vindicated by ex
post monetary awards with interest to reflect the time value of money.
Creditors who claim their security interests have been violated, officers who
claim their salaries have been wrongfully clawed back, directors who claim
to be unfairly deprived of their paid positions—all of these aggrieved
persons can be made whole by an award of money damages. Unlawful
actions that can be rectified by such damages are generally not regarded as
presenting the kind of irreparable harm justifying injunctive relief. 207
205F

206F

207F

208F

reiterate” (citation omitted)); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018-19 (1984) (finding
that an action under the Tucker Act remained available as a remedy for any uncompensated taking
that an applicant for registration of the pesticide might suffer as a result of the operation of the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act’s data consideration and disclosure provisions).
For application of the principle in the bankruptcy context, see Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 126-27 (1974), which viewed the Tucker Act remedy as covering any shortfall
between the remedy provided by the Regional Rail Reorganization Act and just compensation.
204 See Dodd–Frank Act § 210(e), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(e) (2012) (providing that “any remedy
against the corporation or receiver shall be limited to money damages determined in accordance
with this title”); see also id. § 210(a)(8)(D), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(8)(D) (“Except as otherwise
provided in this title, no court shall have jurisdiction over . . . any claim relating to any act or
omission of . . . the Corporation as receiver.”). By and large, any claims against the FDIC will by
brought by creditors and others with various rights stemming from their pre-receivership
relationship with a covered financial company that were extinguished or modified by FDIC
receivership under the OLA.
205 Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 (2013).
206 Thomas W. Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2015) (manuscript at 30) (on file with authors).
207 See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“According to
well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction . . . must
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If the only constitutional questions presented were takings and
impairment of contract claims and the government’s authority was otherwise
uncontested, this argument would be well founded. But if the government’s
authority to proceed in the manner directed by the statute is challenged on
other constitutional grounds, an ex post award of damages would not be a
sufficient remedy. 208 The Due Process Clause says that no one shall be
deprived of property without due process of law. 209 This generally means, at
least where conventional property interests are at stake, that a person must
be given an opportunity to challenge the legal authority of the government
before his or her property is taken. 210 Thus, if a firm makes a credible
contention that government is seeking its liquidation in a manner contrary
to law, this issue should be resolved before the government liquidates the
firm. Once the firm’s assets are sold off and it is liquidated, the firm cannot
be put back together again. Claims based on Article III of the Constitution,
on the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity requirement, or on the First
Amendment would also seem to be the sort of claims that cannot be rectified
by ex post damages awards. At least as to these constitutional claims, the
firm facing liquidation will suffer irreparable harm if the inquiry is postponed
until after the firm is fully dissolved.
209F

210F

21F

demonstrate[, among other things,] . . . that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
are inadequate to compensate for that injury . . . .” (citation omitted)); Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987) (“In brief, the bases for injunctive relief are irreparable injury
and the inadequacy of legal remedies.”); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)
(“The Court has repeatedly held that the basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always
been irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies.” (citation omitted)).
208 Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 707-08
(1990) (noting that injunctions are the standard remedy in cases asserting violations of constitutional rights). Even takings claims are subject to this limiting principle. The Takings Clause has
been interpreted to mean that the government can take property only for a public use. See Kelo v.
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477-78 (2005) (differentiating between permitted takings for
public use and prohibited takings for purely private benefit). If a property owner contends the
taking is not for a public use, the owner’s claim must be resolved before the taking occurs, not
after. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (citing of cases supporting the
proposition that property cannot be taken “‘without a justifying public purpose, even though
compensation be paid,’” implying that this is a threshold issue requiring resolution at the outset
(citations omitted)). If the court postpones considering the issue, and the taking is later determined not to be for a public use, there will be no way to correct the constitutional violation. An
award of just compensation simply cannot remedy a constitutional right that property not be taken
in the first place. Note that we are not suggesting a firm could mount a successful public use
argument against a Dodd–Frank receivership. The point is more general.
209 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
210 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1991) (holding that a Connecticut statute
authorizing prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice or hearing and without
requiring a showing of exigent circumstances did not satisfy due process requirements).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: PROCESS OBJECTIONS
The prospect of the appointment of the FDIC to liquidate a firm under
Title II would likely spark deep anxiety in a variety of the targeted firm’s
stakeholders. Creditors would worry that they will not get any of their
money back or that they will get only liquidation value, as opposed to the
potentially greater “going concern” value available through reorganization.
Officers and directors would worry that they will be out of a job or, worse,
that they will be held personally liable for the failure of the firm. 211 Shareholders would be concerned by the prospect of having their investments
wiped out. Each of these groups would have an incentive to bolster its
position by raising constitutional objections to the OLA process. Arguments
conceivably could be advanced under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, Article III of the Constitution, the Uniformity Clause of the
Bankruptcy Power, the First Amendment, and the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. In this Part, we consider the various process objections
that could be brought in under the Due Process Clause and Article III.
21F

A. Due Process
In order to establish a due process violation, a claimant must show that
he or she has a life, liberty, or property interest; that the government is
threatening to deprive him or her of that interest; and that the deprivation
will take place without affording him or her adequate notice or opportunity
to be heard. 212
We assume that all relevant parties who might feel threatened by the
prospect of a Title II liquidation would satisfy the threshold requirement of
having a “property” interest at stake. For purposes of due process, property
includes money and securities; thus, creditors of all stripes have constitutionally protected property interests in the assets of a debtor firm. 213
213F

214F

211 Dodd–Frank Act § 204(a)(2)-(3), 12 U.S.C. § 5384(a)(2)-(3) (2012) (establishing that management
deemed by the FDIC to be responsible for the failing of the financial firm must be terminated
and, perhaps more significantly, that “all parties, including management, directors, and third
parties, having responsibility for the condition of the financial company bear losses consistent with
their responsibility, including actions for damages, restitution, and recoupment of compensation
and other gains not compatible with such responsibility”). Given that the Title II regulations
promulgated by the FDIC establish a presumption that the failed financial firm’s chairman, CEO,
president, CFO, and other similarly situated management personnel are “substantially responsible
for the failed condition” of the company, there is a good chance that such persons would incur some
type of personal liability or monetary penalty. 12 C.F.R. § 380.7(b)(1)(i).
212 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
213 See Tulsa Prof ’l Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (holding that an
unsecured creditor’s claim is “property” for purposes of procedural due process).
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Property also includes gainful employment, at least if the employee has an
unexpired employment contract that makes him or her more than an at will
employee. 214 Consequently, officers and directors who will lose their positions
through an exercise of the OLA have a property interest under the Due
Process Clause, provided they are working under an unexpired employment
contract. It is also undeniable that the actions taken by the FDIC in
completing an orderly liquidation would constitute action that would
deprive these parties of their respective interests.
In assessing what process is due, the Supreme Court has tended to treat
notice as a requirement distinct from other procedural elements. 215 Notice
by mail or a similarly effective method is generally required for any proceeding
that will adversely affect the property rights of an affected party as long as
their name and address are “reasonably ascertainable.” 216 The notice
requirement calls into question the constitutionality of the Act’s criminal
penalties for providing notice to anyone other than the firm possibly facing
receivership. 217 Shareholders, counterparties, creditors, and officers deemed
to be responsible for the financial distress of the firm may have their
interests compromised or completely wiped out by mandatory liquidation
under Title II, and yet the statute makes it a criminal offense to provide
them with the notice that would allow them to voice their objections before
liquidation commences.
In response, the government would undoubtedly point to bank receiverships,
where traditionally no formal notice is given before a receiver is appointed
215F

216F

217F

218F

214 See FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240 (1988) (finding that “appellee’s interest in the
right to continue to serve as president of the bank and to participate in the conduct of its affairs is
a property right protected by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause”); Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-41 (1985) (finding that, absent a valid cause for termination,
civil service employment is a property interest under applicable state law and thus subject to due
process protection).
215 See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006) (“Before a State may take property[,] . . . the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to provide the owner
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a
century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: Parties whose rights are to
be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be
notified.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
216 See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983) (“Notice by mail or
other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a
proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interest of any party.”); Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“An elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and to afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” (citations omitted)).
217 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(C) (2012).
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and property seized. 218 In practice, however, the appointment of a receiver
will typically come as no surprise to the bank and its officers and directors.
As the D.C. Circuit has observed, bank regulators ordinarily raise concerns
about the adequacy of the bank’s reserves or other financial issues with bank
officers over an extended period of time before initiating receivership
procedures, giving the bank an idea of the relevant issues and an opportunity
to respond, albeit informally. 219 Whether nonbank financial firms will
similarly be alerted to the possibility of seizure under Title II through
informal communications with regulators is unclear; certainly, the statute
does not require it. Further, even if the firm has been given effective notice,
notice cannot legally be given to creditors and other stakeholders.
The government would inevitably fall back on the position that exigent
circumstances, such as public health emergencies, sometimes require it to
act without giving advance notice. The government would argue that
advance notice to all reasonably ascertainable stakeholders cannot be given
before seizing the firm pursuant to the OLA, because such notice could
trigger the very financial panic or instability Dodd–Frank was designed to
prevent. Such arguments have been accepted in other emergency contexts,
but almost invariably with the caveat that a prompt post-deprivation
hearing is made available, during which the legality of the seizure may be
challenged and the property restored to its rightful owner if the seizure
turns out to have been unwarranted. 220 Justice Jackson, in Fahey v. Mallonee,
described bank seizure as a “drastic procedure” justified by “the delicate
nature of the institution and the impossibility of preserving credit during an
investigation.” 221 But the procedure at issue there 222 provided for extensive
219F

20F

21F

2F

23F

218 See David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 119 (2010) (noting that twentyone banks were closed in 2009 “without any prior notice by the agency”).
219 James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099-1101 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that the
numerous opportunities for both the bank and its officers to respond to bank examiners’ findings
served as adequate replacement for a formal pre-seizure hearing).
220 See, e.g., FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240-41 (1988) (finding that the public interest in
an orderly liquidation of the seized bank necessitated holding the hearing after the seizure had
already occurred); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947) (permitting seizure of a bank
prior to a hearing in light of the risks to the bank’s assets and operations posed by delay and public
awareness of an investigation into the bank); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 30 (1928)
(holding that deprivation prior to formal proceedings is permissible, provided that some means to
challenge the deprivation is provided before it becomes final); N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v.
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315-21 (1908) (allowing seizure and destruction of tainted food prior to a
hearing due to public health dangers, provided that a post-seizure hearing must be permitted).
221 Fahey, 332 U.S. at 253.
222 The procedure being challenged in Fahey was set forth in section 5(d) of the Home Owners’
Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, § 5(d), 48 Stat. 128, 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§1464(d) (2012)). This provision gave the Board of the Federal Home Loan Administration the
authority to reorganize, consolidate, merge, or liquidate federal savings and loan associations,

2014]

207

Dodd–Frank: Too Big for the Constitution?

hearing rights, including a full particularization of the reasons for the
seizure, within a matter of days after the seizure. 223 Dodd–Frank’s OLA, as
amended by the Senate, eliminates the right to post-seizure judicial review
routinely available (even if rarely invoked) in the banking industry. Under
Dodd–Frank, creditors who dispute the FDIC’s determination of the
priority or the valuation of their individual claims can seek judicial review. 224
But the government could point to no provision in the statute that provides
a post-seizure remedy to any other stakeholder, including creditors who
believe they would obtain more for their claims in a reorganization in
bankruptcy, making it much more difficult to justify the absence of notice to
these affected persons or institutions.
Beyond notice, the extremely abbreviated twenty-four-hour period
required by Title II between the filing of the petition and the automatic
grant of the petition also presents due process concerns. Realistically, it is
hard to imagine that this is adequate time for the firm to mount an effective
defense or for the court to engage in meaningful deliberation. 225 To be sure,
the only issues the court may consider are whether the Secretary acted in an
arbitrary and capricious fashion in determining that the firm is a “financial
company,” as defined by the statute, 226 and that the firm is in default or in
danger of default. 227 But if these elements are contested, it is inconceivable
that the firm could put together and present to the court a coherent rebuttal
and that the court could digest the issues and render a well-considered
24F

25F

26F

27F

28F

including the power to appoint a conservator or a receiver to take charge of the affairs of any
association. Id.
223 Fahey, 332 U.S. at 252-53.
224 Dodd–Frank Act § 210(a)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(4) (2012).
225 See Kenneth Scott, Dodd Frank: Resolution or Expropriation (Feb. 29, 2012) (Stanford
Law Sch.), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1673849 (“The Dodd–
Frank Act squeezes pre-seizure due process down to the vanishing point.”).
226 Dodd–Frank Act § 201(11), 12 U.S.C. § 5381(11). The section defines “financial company”
as a bank holding company, nonbank financial company supervised by the Federal Reserve Board,
or any company or subsidiary of a company previously determined by the Federal Reserve to be
predominately engaged in activities “financial in nature.” Id. For a more comprehensive overview
of what constitutes a financial company for the purposes of Title II, see supra note 134.
227 The standard for determining whether a financial firm is in default or in danger of default
is defined by Dodd–Frank Act § 203(c)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(c)(4), which sets forth four alternative
conditions for such a finding. Some of these conditions, such as that a bankruptcy case is likely to
be promptly commenced, id. § 203(c)(4)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(c)(4)(A), might be proven by
documentary or testimonial evidence, and could conceivably be resolved in one day, provided the
evidence was already in hand. But other conditions, such as that the firm “has incurred, or is likely
to incur, losses that will deplete all or substantially all of its capital, and there is no reasonable
prospect for the company to avoid such depletion,” id. § 203(c)(4)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(c)(4)(B),
would seem to require complex expert witness testimony that would be impossible to rebut or sort
out in twenty-four hours.
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decision within the extremely compressed time period. The impracticality
of the deadline would be particularly apparent in any review of the FDIC’s
finding that the firm is in default or in danger of default, which could entail
examining hundreds of disputed accounting issues, many of great complexity.
The judicial review process is made even more problematic by the lack
of guidance on the intended meaning of Dodd–Frank’s “arbitrary and
capricious” standard of review. 228 While the APA directs courts to set aside
agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law,” 229 a standard which expressly encompasses
questions of law as well as fact, Dodd–Frank uses only the term “arbitrary
and capricious.” 230 Does Dodd–Frank’s omission of the phrase “otherwise
not in accordance with law” mean that the district court may not review
disputed questions of law? Such a construction would very likely be unconstitutional. 231 The fundamental objective of the Due Process Clause is to
assure that the government deprives persons of their property only in
accordance with the law, that is, with “due process of law.” 232 An attempt by
Congress to cut off any ability to challenge the lawfulness of a taking of
property—at both the administrative and the judicial level—would almost
certainly contravene due process.
The statute’s limitation of judicial review to just two of the seven factors
that the Secretary of the Treasury must consider in determining whether to
petition for appointment of a receiver creates further due process problems.
Dodd–Frank requires the Secretary to petition for a receivership if he
makes seven enumerated determinations listed in the statute. 233 However,
there is no provision for an administrative hearing to review any of the
seven determinations, and only two of the seven are subject to judicial
scrutiny, which must occur in the previously described twenty-four-hour
hearing pursuant to the rather ambiguous “arbitrary and capricious” standard
of review. 234 How can the government seize and liquidate a major financial
firm based on five determinations that are never subject to any administrative
29F

230F

231F

23F

23F

234F

235F

228
229
230
231

Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iv)(I)-(II), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv)(I)-(II).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(iv)(I)-(II), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv)(I)-(II).
See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932) (“In cases brought to enforce constitutional
rights, the judicial power of the United States necessarily extends to the independent determination
of all questions, both of fact and law, necessary to the performance of that supreme function.”);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 915, 943-49 (1988) (discussing the importance of independent determinations of law by
Article III courts).
232 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
233 Dodd–Frank Act § 203(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b) (2012).
234 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii).
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or judicial review? Ordinarily, persons may not be deprived of property by
administrative action that is immune from all review by the courts. 235 Why,
then, can financial firms be liquidated without any opportunity to contest
the legal determinations that support this action?
Admittedly, some determinations required by Dodd–Frank involve
discretionary judgments best left to an agency’s expertise, such as the
finding that resolution of the firm under ordinary bankruptcy law “would
have serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United States.” 236
But others are highly factual, such as the finding that the financial firm has
been ordered “to convert all convertible debt instruments.” 237 Eliminating
all avenues of challenging this latter type of factual determination, either
through ex ante or ex post review, is hard to justify as consistent with due
process.
Is it possible to defend the extremely limited judicial review provided by
Title II based on the government’s paramount interest in preventing
financial meltdown? The general due process standard for procedural
adequacy is the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, which focuses on three
factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;”
(2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirements would entail.” 238 The magnitude of
the private interest at stake will depend on who is bringing the challenge.
The firm, its directors and officers, and its shareholders may have the
greatest interests. First, the statute mandates that any firm placed in an
OLA receivership must be liquidated and that all shareholder equity must
be wiped out before other creditors take a hit. 239 Second, all responsible
directors are presumptively subject to dismissal. 240 Directors of systemically
significant financial firms may not elicit as much sympathy from the courts
236F

237F

238F

239F

240F

241F

235 See, e.g., Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 456-57 (1890)
(holding that a statute giving a regulatory commission authority to prescribe rates without any
possibility of judicial review violated due process).
236 Dodd–Frank Act § 203(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(2) (2012).
237 Id. § 203(b)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(6).
238 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
239 See Dodd–Frank Act § 206(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5386(2) (mandating that shareholders “of a
covered financial company do not receive payment until after all other claims and the Fund are
fully paid”).
240 See supra note 211.

210

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 165

as school janitors or welfare recipients, 241 but directorships are paid
positions and, under the statute, the appointment of receiver is the critical
decision that determines whether a director keeps or loses her position.
Once a receiver is appointed, directors will invariably be terminated. 242
Third, creditors will have more difficulty arguing that their interests are
significant. Although Title II gives creditors the right to bring a judicial
proceeding to determine the validity of their claims, it limits a creditor’s
compensation to the amount that the claimant would receive in a liquidation
of the firm. 243 Finally, officers who fear dismissal may be met with the
argument that consideration of this prospect at the time of appointment of a
receiver is premature. Dismissal of an officer is required only if that person
is found “responsible for the failed condition of the covered financial
company.” 244 Thus, any challenge by officers may not be ripe until the
FDIC determines those officers warrant dismissal.
The government will undoubtedly argue that the procedures prescribed
by Title II serve public interests of the highest magnitude. Dodd–Frank’s
limited notice and rocket-like hearing requirements are designed to prevent
a financial panic analogous to a run on the bank, which could occur if
ordinary judicial procedures were followed. In order to prevent future
financial crises caused by the collapse of a too big to fail nonbank financial
firm, Congress determined that the government must be able to seize and
liquidate the firm in an expeditious, in camera process. Stated in these
terms, it is difficult to see how the interests of a single firm or its shareholders
and directors and officers in avoiding liquidation outweigh the prevention of
24F

243F

24F

245F

241 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (ruling that a school
janitor with an undisclosed criminal record was entitled to a hearing before termination given the
importance of employment to an individual’s welfare); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970)
(holding that welfare recipients are entitled to an adjudicatory hearing before termination of their
benefits given the “brutal need” eligible recipients have for such funds).
242 See Dodd–Frank Act § 206(5), 12 U.S.C. § 5386(5) (requiring removal of the directors
“responsible for the failed condition” of the company).
243 Id. § 210(a)(7)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(7)(B); id. § 210(d)(2)-(3), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(d)(2)-(3).
The confusing language used in these sections appears to establish liquidation value as both a
ceiling and a floor. Section 210(a)(7)(B) speaks to what a creditor, at minimum, must receive,
specifically providing that “[a] creditor shall, in no event, receive less than the amount that the
creditor is entitled to receive under paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (d), as applicable.” Id.
§ 210(a)(7)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(7)(B). However, section 210(d)(2) does not actually address the
issue of a creditor’s minimum recovery. Id. § 210(d)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(d)(2). Instead, it speaks
to the “maximum liability of the Corporation,” explicitly limiting the amount that the FDIC, as
receiver, will have to pay out to any creditor of the financial firm to what the creditor would have
received if the firm was liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
244 Id. § 206(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5386(4).
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an economic crisis. If forced to choose between patent unfairness and
economic disaster, courts will likely acquiesce in patent unfairness.
Notice, however, that the Mathews v. Eldridge test appears to contemplate
a marginalist inquiry. The test’s primary question is not whether the totality
of private interests outweighs the totality of governmental interests but
whether “additional or substitute procedural safeguards” would be worth
more or less than the “fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 245 In the context of an
OLA petition, the Mathews standard implies, for example, that the court
should ask whether affording a financial firm, say, an additional twenty-four
hours to mount a defense (with the proceedings remaining under seal) is
worth more in terms of preventing unfairness than the costs of increasing
the risk of financial disaster. There is, of course, no definitive answer to
such a question, which highlights a key problem associated with Mathews’s
risk–utility test more generally. 246 However, posing the question in this way
would at least increase the odds that a court would agree that Dodd–Frank
violates due process in that at least some additional procedures in the
expedited process would be worth more than the administrative burdens
those procedures would create.
Given the intractable nature of the Mathews balancing test, especially as
applied to such a high-stakes situation as a looming financial crisis, it is
virtually certain that the parties and the court would look to similar processes
in other contexts in order to decide whether Title II comports with due
process. In particular, the government would inevitably emphasize that
existing bank receivership laws allow regulators to seize banking companies
with no advance judicial process at all. 247
The problem with this analogy is twofold. First, as emphasized above,
the banking receivership statutes provide for judicial review after the seizure
takes place. 248 Both the Administration’s Combined Draft and the House
bill followed this model, providing for judicial review after the seizure of a
systemically significant nonbank financial firm, without restriction as to the
246F

247F

248F

249F

245
246

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process as Social-Cost Accounting, 9 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1423, 1429-30 (1980–1981) (describing objections to the Mathews balancing test).
247 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority
Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg.
64173, 64178 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380) (emphasizing that the
proposed rule’s treatment of long-term unsecured senior debt is consistent with existing treatment
of such debt in FDIC bank receivership regulations).
248 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(7) (2012); see also supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
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issues presented or the time the court takes to reach a decision. 249 The
Senate, however, eliminated post-seizure review and substituted an
extremely limited, one-day pre-seizure review restricted to just two
determinations. 250 The Senate’s revisions thus made it far more difficult to
defend the statute against a due process challenge.
Second, the rationale for dispensing with ex ante procedures in the bank
receivership context depends in significant part on a quid pro quo or waiver
argument linked to government deposit insurance. The leading precedent is
Fahey v. Mallonee, which involved a constitutional challenge to the takeover
of a federally chartered savings and loan association by the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board. 251 In denying the saving and loan association’s constitutional challenge, Justice Jackson alluded to the heightened need for public
regulation of banks, given their susceptibility to panics and their potential
impact on the wider economy. 252 He also reasoned that the association in
that case was “estopped” from challenging the law because it had voluntarily
sought a federal charter, knowing that a takeover was possible should the
Bank Board become concerned about its financial condition. 253 As Justice
Jackson put it, “[i]t would be intolerable that the Congress should endow an
Association with the right to conduct a public banking business on certain
limitations and that the Court at the behest of those who took advantage
from the privilege should remove the limitations intended for public
protection.” 254
The quid pro quo theme has recurred in more recent cases involving due
process challenges to various administrative actions taken by bank regulators;
often, the courts in these cases emphasize the benefit of deposit insurance to
banks, namely that it greatly promotes public confidence in the banking
system. 255 Ordinary bank receiverships and related summary actions occur
250F

251F

25F

253F

254F

25F

256F

249
250
251

See supra text accompanying notes 89-97.
See supra note 113.
332 U.S. 245, 247-48 (1947). The challenge was grounded in the nondelegation doctrine, but
the Supreme Court addressed the limited procedural protections in its analysis. Id. at 252-55 & n.1.
252 Id. at 256.
253 Id. at 250, 256.
254 Id.
255 See, e.g., FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 248 (1988) (rejecting a due process challenge to a
statutory provision authorizing the FDIC to suspend from office a bank official indicted for
crime); James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099-1101 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting a due
process challenge to OCC and FDIC actions declaring a bank holding company insolvent and
seizing company assets); Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. DLG Fin. Corp., 29 F.3d 993,
1000-03 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting a due process challenge to a preliminary injunction freezing
assets of a corporation and its sole shareholder for possible violations of the Bank Holding
Company Act); Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435, 1439-42 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a due process
challenge to a temporary cease and desist order requiring a former bank officer to pay $21 million
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in a context in which the most significant assets of the insolvent bank—the
deposits made by its customers—are insured by the federal government,
giving the federal government strong justification for moving quickly and
without advance notice to take over an insolvent bank in order to limit the
government’s exposure on its insurance obligations. This context also allows
the government to say that the bank voluntarily assumed the risk of
summary action in exchange for taxpayers’ promise to foot the bill for any
missteps or even misconduct by the bank. The banks, one could say, must
take the bitter with the sweet. 256
This sort of quid pro quo argument cannot easily be extended to the
nonbank financial firms subject to Title II orderly liquidation. 257 Large
nonbank financial firms are not chartered by the government and do not
have the close interaction with regulatory agencies that characterizes banks.
They may be subject to oversight by the Securities Exchange Commission
or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, but such oversight does
not rise to the same level of scrutiny as the visitorial authority that regulators
exercise over banks. 258 And, of course, the government does not formally
insure funds and investments held by clients in these nonbank financial
firms. Perhaps TARP and the bailout regime could be characterized as an
implicit guarantee by the government that systemically significant firms will
not be allowed to fail, but Title II is designed to eliminate such a guarantee.
Indeed, Title II was designed to ensure the government will never again
foot the bill for any capital infusions required by the resolution process.
Framed in these terms, it is much more difficult to claim that the government
has delivered enough of the “sweet” to declare that firms liquidated under
257F

258F

259F

dollars in restitution pending administrative review); FDIC v. Bank of Coushatta, 930 F.2d 1122,
1129-32 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that review of a capital directive to a bank was prohibited since
issuance of the directive was left to the FDIC’s discretion, and the administrative process from
which the directive and the enforcement order resulted satisfied due process); Haralson v. Fed.
Home Loan Bank Bd., 837 F.2d 1123, 1126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (rejecting a due process challenge to
the appointment of a conservator pursuant to a statute providing for review only after seizure of
assets).
256 Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974) (plurality opinion) (advancing a “bitter
with the sweet” argument in the context of a due process challenge); id. at 166-67 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the result in part) (rejecting the argument); id. at 177-78, 185
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same); id. at 211 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(same).
257 See Zaring, supra note 218, at 129-30 (arguing that the FDIC should not be able “to act to
take over and shut down institutions that it does not insure or regulate”).
258 See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519, 526-27 (2009) (explaining that
“visitorial” powers give the controlling authority the right to superintend the management of the
entity, standing in stark contrast to the powers of a regulator possessing only the authority to
redress grievances and frauds).
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Title II have voluntarily assumed the risk of getting the “bitter.” Consequently,
Dodd–Frank’s OLA cannot be justified by the kind of estoppel argument
adopted in Fahey v. Mallonee. 259
Sadly and ironically, the short notice required by the statute will produce
an advantage in litigation for the government that will be extremely difficult
for the financial company to overcome. The government, for example, can
prepare briefs in advance suggesting that the sky will fall if a systemically
significant firm is not immediately placed in receivership. The government
can also anticipate the due process objections and can have its briefs well
prepared with extensive citations to banking and public health emergency
cases. The financial firm and other interested parties, on the other hand,
may be caught by surprise and find it nearly impossible to rebut these
authorities in the condensed period of time they have to respond. The
violation of due process may itself assure that the due process defense fails,
at the very least for those stakeholders who receive no notice until after the
receivership is approved.
The last point to make in connection with the due process issues raised
by Title II is that these problems would have been easily avoided if Congress
had followed the Administration’s Combined Draft and the House bill that
both provided for administrative appointment of a receiver followed by a
statutory right to post-seizure judicial review. 260 It is well established that
some kind of hearing is required before a property owner is conclusively
deprived of a protected property interest. 261 However, it is not always
necessary that the hearing occur before the initial taking. 262 Specifically, the
260F

261F

26F

263F

259 332 U.S. 245, 255-56 (1947) (providing that “[i]t is an elementary rule of constitutional
law that one may not retain the benefits of the Act while attacking the constitutionality of one of
its important conditions” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
260 See Administration’s Combined Draft, supra note 15, § 1205; see also Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1605 (2009).
261 See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433-434 (1982) (“[T]he state may
not finally destroy a property interest without first giving the putative owner an opportunity to
present his claim of entitlement.” (citation omitted)); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-82 (1972)
(providing that “the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
262 See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978) (noting that
“[o]n occasion, th[e] Court has recognized that where the potential length or severity of the
deprivation does not indicate a likelihood of serious loss and where the procedures underlying the
decision to act are sufficiently reliable to minimize the risk of erroneous determination, government
may act without providing additional advance procedural safeguards” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680 (1977) (finding that the need to
provide additional procedural safeguards depends on a balancing of the benefits and costs of those
procedures); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-34 (1976) (describing cases in which a fullfledged evidentiary hearing was not required before the initial taking); Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S.
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timing, nature and procedural requirements of any mandatory hearing
under the Due Process Clause will depend on balancing the competing
interests involved. 263 These include the importance of the private interest,
the length or finality of the deprivation at issue, the probability of government
error, and the importance of governmental interests involved, including the
administrative practicality of providing an ex ante hearing and the sufficiency
of substitute ex post procedures. 264 Given the substantial public interest in
avoiding a financial panic, the practical constraints on providing advance
notice to numerous creditors with property interests at stake and the need
for expedition, it is hard to imagine a court finding ex post review unjustified.
As we have seen, for practical reasons, banks only rarely invoke their
right to seek post-seizure review. But the availability of such review is an
important safeguard against executive abuse of the enormous power conferred
by Title II. Post-seizure review eliminates the notice problem, because all
the world will know about the receiver’s appointment. Ex post review also
eliminates the need to rush through the proceeding in twenty-four hours or
truncate the issues so that only a fraction of the potential points of legal
controversy are subject to review. The Senate blundered in thinking that a
sham review before appointment of a receiver is preferable to a right to
plenary review afterwards.
264F

265F

B. Article III
The compressed process for obtaining a judicial order establishing a
FDIC receivership is also vulnerable to challenge on Article III grounds.
Indeed, the Article III objection may strike an even more sympathetic chord
with courts than the due process claim, because it implicates the constitutional
authority and autonomy of the courts as a separate branch of the federal
government.
We hasten to point out that the Article III issue is not the one typically
associated with bankruptcy laws, as in Stern v. Marshall 265 or Northern
26F

57, 62 (1919) (upholding the constitutionality of a taking that precedes the determination of just
compensation).
263 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (explaining that “resolution of the issue
of whether the administrative procedures provided . . . are constitutionally sufficient requires
analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected” (citation omitted)).
264 FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240-41 (1988); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 339-49.
265 See 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2618 (2011) (holding that a non-Article III bankruptcy judge cannot
constitutionally enter a final judgment on a counterclaim based on state law unless the counterclaim
“stems out of the bankruptcy” or “would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process”).
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Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 266 In those cases, the
Court was concerned with whether the Bankruptcy Court—an Article I
tribunal—could resolve claims of private right under the common law of
contract and tort subject only to deferential review by an Article III district
court. The initiation of a Dodd–Frank OLA proceeding, in contrast, would
almost surely be classified as involving public, rather than private, rights. 267
An OLA action is commenced by a federal official, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and seeks the appointment of a federal agency (typically, the
FDIC) as receiver. The decision to grant the petition and the standards for
conducting the receivership are governed by federal, rather than state, law.
The goal of the action is grounded in public interest considerations—
preventing a panic that would disrupt the financial markets and lead to
economic distress—rather than in resolving claims between private debtors
and creditors. Although the receivership will result in the resolution of
numerous private claims, disposing of these claims is incidental to its
primary purpose. Thus, although the Supreme Court has never identified a
bright-line distinction between private and public rights, the OLA action
seems to clearly fall on the public rights side of the line. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly affirmed that public rights actions need not be tried in
Article III courts, meaning Congress can choose whether such actions
should be tried in either Article III courts or administrative tribunals. 268
Moreover, in contrast to the claims at issue in Marshall and Northern
Pipeline, the decision to appoint a receiver and initiate a liquidation of a
financial firm is formally made by an Article III court—the District Court
for the District of Columbia—and not by an administrative body or an
Article I court. The statute provides that, “[i]f the Court determines that
267F

268F

269F

266 See 458 U.S. 50, 70 (1982) (holding that, while Congress may transfer traditional judicial
functions to non-Article III tribunals for those matters concerning statutorily created rights, it is
precluded from altering the adjudication of rights not created by statute and, accordingly, must
limit the functions of the adjunct court to preserve a party’s rights to adjudication by an Article III
court).
267 Thus, we question the analysis in Brent J. Horton, How Dodd–Frank’s Orderly Liquidation
Authority for Financial Companies Violates Article III of the United States Constitution, 36 J. CORP. L.
869 (2011), which implicitly treats the appointment of a receiver as a matter of private right for
Article III purposes. On the constitutional distinction between public and private rights, as
reflected in the jurisprudence of Article III, see generally Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-70;
Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (2007).
268 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57-58 (1932) (explaining that Congress can create
administrative tribunals by statute, with limitations on their scope of review); Den ex dem. Murray
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855) (“[T]here are matters, involving
public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on
them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which [C]ongress may or may not
bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.”).
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the determination of the Secretary [on the two reviewable determinations]
is not arbitrary and capricious, the Court shall issue an order immediately
authorizing the Secretary to appoint the [FDIC] as receiver of the covered
financial company.” 269 There is no attempt here to transfer authority away
from an Article III court to some other tribunal. The authority to appoint
the receiver is formally conferred by an order issued by the district court. 270
The statute further avoids traditional Northern Pipeline–type problems by
allowing creditors of the financial firm subject to the OLA to bring an
action in federal district court if they are dissatisfied with the receiver’s
resolution of their claims. 271 The statute appears to contemplate that these
judicial proceedings will be tried de novo—not under a standard of deferential
administrative review. 272
The principal Article III problem with Dodd–Frank, rather, arises from
its severe restrictions on the time that the Article III court is given to
consider an important question, as well as the scope of the issues it can
consider in resolving that question. 273 In effect, the statute calls upon an
Article III court to make a significant decision, for both the financial firm
and the economy, yet constrains the court in such a way that it cannot
execute its duty to make this decision in a manner consistent with its Article
III judicial power. One might say that Dodd–Frank commandeers the courts
to lend their prestige and legitimacy to what is essentially an administrative
process without respecting the traditional mode and manner in which
Article III courts function. 274 In our view, any court told that it must rule on
a petition to establish a receivership to liquidate a huge financial firm, and
270F

271F

27F

273F

274F

275F

269
270

Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(iv), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv) (2012) (emphasis added).
The issue is admittedly murkier if the district court fails to make a determination within
twenty-four hours. In such situations, the statute declares—in the passive voice—that “the petition
shall be granted by operation of law” and then adds that “the Secretary shall appoint the Corporation
as receiver.” Id. § 202(a)(1)(v)(A)(I)-(II), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(v)(I)-(II). Arguably, the Secretary
of the Treasury is the appointing authority in these circumstances.
271 Id. § 210(a)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(4).
272 See id. (“[A] claimant may file suit on a claim (or continue an action commenced before
the date of appointment of the Corporation as receiver) in the district or territorial court of the
United States for the district within which the principal place of business of the covered financial
company is located (and such court shall have jurisdiction to hear such claim).”).
273 Perhaps this should be termed a separation of powers issue, rather than an Article III
issue, to avoid confusion with Northern Pipeline–style claims.
274 Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that “[t]he Federal Government
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program” because “such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system
of dual sovereignty”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (finding that the
principles of federalism do not permit Congress to commandeer state governments to act as
enforcement agents of federal law).
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that it has only twenty-four hours to consider the question, will be unhappy
with its appointed role.
One sign of judicial discomfort with Dodd–Frank is the D.C. District
Court’s Local Civil Rule 85, which was amended to implement Dodd–Frank’s
in camera procedure for appointment of a receiver. 275 The new Rule provides in part that “[t]he [Treasury] Secretary shall provide written notice
under seal to the Clerk of the Court that a petition will likely be filed with
the Court, and to the extent feasible, the notice will be provided at least 48
hours prior to filing the petition.” 276 Dodd–Frank provides no authority for
this advance notice requirement, although presumably the Secretary of the
Treasury will attempt to comply. The additional forty-eight-hour notice is
evidently designed to facilitate assignment of a judge to the matter and to
allow that judge to clear his or her docket (as well as personal schedule) for
the twenty-four-hour marathon that is to come.277 This procedural requirement
will relieve some pressure on the judge deciding the petition, although the
content of the petition itself and any objections by the financial firm will
not be made available until the twenty-four-hour clock starts ticking. Local
Civil Rule 85 thus cannot obviate the reality that a single judge must decide
whether to order the liquidation of a systemically significant financial firm
under circumstances reminiscent of a law school take-home examination.
The Article III problem is exacerbated by the statute’s restriction preventing
the court from reviewing five of the seven threshold determinations that
must be resolved before an OLA receivership is established. The court may
consider only whether the Secretary of the Treasury acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in finding that the firm (1) met the statutory definition of a
“financial company” and (2) “is in default or in danger of default.” 278 The
other five statutory triggering conditions cannot be considered by the
court. 279 Yet the judgment the court is asked to render—granting a petition
to appoint a receiver leading to mandatory liquidation—necessarily presupposes
that all of the statutory triggering conditions have been met. The court
may—and should—be uncomfortable rendering a judgment that rests on
legal and factual determinations it is not empowered to review. Again, the
objective of the statute appears to draw upon the prestige of the court as an
276F

27F

278F

279F

280F

275
276
277

D.D.C. CIV. R. 85.
D.D.C. CIV. R. 85(b).
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-735, BANKRUPTCY: AGENCIES
CONTINUE RULEMAKINGS FOR CLARIFYING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF ORDERLY LIQUIDATION
AUTHORITY 15 (2012) (explaining that the forty-eight-hour warning was intended to give the
court time to prepare for the review).
278 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).
279 See supra text accompanying notes 129-134.
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independent tribunal to legitimize a process that is actually driven by the
executive branch. Courts will not take kindly to being conscripted in this
fashion.
There is little precedent to draw upon in considering the Article III
claim. The scope of judicial review under Dodd–Frank is arguably analogous
to Hayburn’s Case, in which the courts were asked to render judgments
subject to revision by the executive. 280 This practice was condemned on the
ground that it made the courts’ judgments nothing more than advisory
opinions. 281 The same conclusion should follow when the executive renders
a decision that the court is asked to incorporate into a judgment without
being given the time or the authority to make the independent determinations
of fact and law necessary to render a proper judicial judgment. The judicial
input in both instances lacks substance and serves only to transfer a measure
of judicial prestige to an executive enterprise. Justice Douglas once warned
that a statute that makes “the federal judiciary a rubber stamp for the
President” would violate Article III. 282 “If the federal court is to be merely
an automaton stamping the papers an Attorney General presents,” he wrote,
“the judicial function rises to no higher level than an IBM machine.” 283
Justice Douglas’s colleagues in the majority disagreed with his interpretation
of the statute under review but not with his understanding that such a
statute would violate Article III. 284
The absence of meaningful precedent to assess the Article III claim is
both a strength and a weakness for potential challengers. It is a strength
insofar as Congress has never before attempted to draw upon the authority
of the courts while simultaneously constraining their ability to function as a
court in such a dramatic fashion. The unprecedented nature of Title II’s
judicial appointment provisions makes them inherently suspect. Conversely,
the novelty of this scheme is a weakness insofar as there is a presumption in
favor of the constitutionality of duly enacted legislation, and courts like to
draw upon clear constitutional language or settled authority before rendering
a judgment that a congressional enactment is unconstitutional.
281F

28F

283F

284F

285F

280
281

See generally Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 83-90 (6th ed. 2009) (explaining the significance of Hayburn’s Case
for understanding the role of Article III courts and noting that “judicial independence requires
that the Article III courts not be subject to requisition by Congress or the executive to act as
subordinates to those two branches in the performance of their characteristic functions”).
282 United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 70-71 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
283 Id. at 71.
284 See id. at 43 (majority opinion) (“Of matters decided judicially, there is no review by
other agencies of the Government.”).
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The provisions authorizing an appeal from a district court order appointing
a receiver raise further Article III questions. If the district court grants the
petition to appoint a receiver, or if the petition is granted as a matter of law
because the district court fails to act within twenty-four hours, the decision
“shall be final, and shall be subject to appeal only in accordance with [the
appeal provisions of Title II].” 285 Moreover, “[t]he decision shall not be
subject to any stay or injunction pending appeal.” 286 If this last sentence is
interpreted to mean that the D.C. Circuit (and, later, the Supreme Court on
a petition for certiorari) has no authority to enjoin or set aside the decision
of the district court once it becomes final, then the “appeal” would have no
function other than to render an advisory opinion as to whether the district
court acted correctly. This would be a plain violation of Article III. 287 To
avoid this conclusion, one must focus on the word “pending” in the sentence
that prohibits any stay or injunction “pending appeal.” This language should
be interpreted to mean that no stay or injunction can be entered while an
appeal is pending before the court of appeals and the Supreme Court, but
once the final appellate decision is rendered, those appellate courts have
authority to overturn the district court decision if they conclude that the
Secretary acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 288
Nevertheless, we are not out of the woods yet. As previously noted,
Dodd–Frank appears to provide that the only relief the court of appeals or
the Supreme Court can grant, if either concludes that the district court
erred, is a remand for further explanation of the findings by the Secretary of
the Treasury. 289 If the receivership goes forward and the only authority of
the appellate courts is to require a better administrative explanation for
what is already a fait accompli, how does this virtually meaningless appellate
review satisfy the prohibition on advisory opinions? Unless the statute is
interpreted to allow the court of appeals or the Supreme Court to enjoin the
receivership, Dodd–Frank’s appeals provisions violate Article III. However,
it is hardly clear that Congress intended to confer the authority to issue an
injunction.
If Dodd–Frank is interpreted as allowing the court of appeals or the
Supreme Court to enjoin a receivership on appeal or a petition for certiorari,
and as imposing no time limit on the court of appeals or the Supreme Court
286F

287F

28F

289F

290F

285
286
287

Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(B) (2012).
Id.
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 281, at 52 (“The prohibition against advisory opinions has
been termed ‘the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability.’” (citation
omitted)).
288 We thank Ron Levin for suggesting this interpretation.
289 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(iv)(II), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv)(II).
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in reaching its determination as to whether the Secretary’s two findings are
arbitrary and capricious, does this solve the Article III problem? Such an
interpretation means that these two courts would not be dragooned into
rendering decisions in a time period too compressed to allow them to act in
proper judicial fashion. However, this interpretation would still subject the
district court to the incredibly tight turnaround time. And the court of
appeals and the Supreme Court would still be limited to considering only
two of the seven factors that authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to
petition for a receivership in the first place. As previously discussed, this
limitation presents an independent due process problem, and might also be
construed as presenting an Article III problem, insofar as the court of
appeals and the Supreme Court are being asked to restrict their review to
only a subset of the legal issues that led to the receiver’s appointment.
Again, this restriction arguably represents an attempt by Congress to
exploit the prestige of the judiciary while preventing it from properly
discharging its judicial function.
Can the district court avoid any insult to its judicial independence by
simply declining to rule on the petition, in which case the petition would
take effect in twenty-four hours by operation of law? By refusing to lend its
prestige to a process that forces the court to act in a nonjudicial manner, the
district court would preserve its dignity. 290 However, the financial firm
could still appeal, in which case the Article III question regarding limiting
the courts’ review to two of the seven determinations would still come up.
More seriously, refusing to rule would spare the court’s dignity at the
expense of the parties subject to orderly liquidation. Indeed, by declining to
participate in the OLA schema, the court would only exacerbate the due
process problem. Not only would the parties be denied all post-seizure
judicial review, they would not even get the extremely abbreviated pre-seizure
review provided under the statute. Seizure of systemically significant
financial firms would therefore take place based on the unreviewable say-so
of the executive branch.
291F

290 Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 ( Jackson, J., dissenting) (“A military
commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if [the Court]
review[s] and approve[s] [those actions], that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the
Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own
image. Nothing better illustrates this danger than does the Court’s opinion in this case.”). Even if
the petition is granted by operation of law (because the district court declined to rule within the
twenty-four-hour timeframe), the district court is still required to “provide . . . for the record a
written statement of each reason supporting [its] decision.” Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(B), 12
U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(B).
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C. Avoidance, Anyone?

Before concluding our discussion of the process objections to Title II,
another wrinkle should be considered—namely, whether the statute can be
construed in a way that would eliminate these constitutional problems. 291
An avoidance reading of Dodd–Frank might find that, although the statute
severely limits what the court can consider and how the court must go about
its review, the APA can be construed in a way that would supplement the
court’s review authority, thereby eliminating possible due process and
Article III objections.
Recall again that the statute requires the Secretary to make seven
determinations before seeking appointment of a receiver but allows the
district court to review only two of those determinations. 292 Is it possible
for a financial firm facing appointment of a receiver to obtain review of the
other five determinations under the APA, without being shackled by
Dodd–Frank’s twenty-four-hour time limit and arbitrary and capricious
standard of review? The APA provides that “[a]gency action[s] made
reviewable by statute and final agency action[s] for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.” 293 This would seem
to fit the supposed situation, given that there is no other adequate remedy
in court if the Secretary of the Treasury has committed legal or factual error
with respect to five of the determinations. Indeed, because Dodd–Frank’s
review provisions severely constrain the court with respect to the two
determinations it can review—imposing a time limit so short it effectively
deprives a firm of any adequate judicial remedy—one could argue that all
seven determinations meet the criteria for review under the APA: the
review process prescribed by Dodd–Frank is plainly not “adequate.”
Can we say the Secretary of the Treasury’s decision to file a petition is a
“final agency action” under the APA? The Supreme Court has instructed
that “two conditions must be satisfied for agency action to be ‘final’: First,
the action must mark the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking
process—it must not be of a tentative or interlocutory nature. And second,
the action must be one by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’
or from which ‘legal consequences will flow.’” 294
29F

293F

294F

295F

291 See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (interpreting the
National Labor Relations Act to not cover lay employees of religious schools in order to avoid
deciding whether such authority would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment).
292 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii), (iv)(I), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii), (iv)(I) (2012).
293 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (emphasis added).
294 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (citations omitted).
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Here, the first factor is clearly met. The Secretary’s decisionmaking process
culminates in filing the petition to appoint a receiver, after which he bows
out and turns the proceedings over to the court and the FDIC.
The second factor is more problematic. In formal terms, the D.C. District
Court, not the Secretary of the Treasury, authorizes appointment of the
receiver. The “legal consequences” (which are considerable) therefore flow
from the court’s decision to grant the petition, not the Secretary’s decision
to file it. Realistically speaking, however, the Secretary’s decision is the one
that matters. The court has only limited grounds available for rejecting a
petition (and then may only remand to the Secretary for further findings)
and has only twenty-four hours to make its determination. One way to
think through this problem is to focus on the way the statute handcuffs the
court by permitting it to review only two of the Secretary’s seven determinations. As to the remaining five factors, the Secretary’s decision is fully
and effectively “final,” since the Dodd–Frank Act does not permit judicial
review. And the factors that are unreviewable by the court are among the
most critical ones to financial firms regulated under Dodd–Frank. 295
A more serious problem is presented by section 701(a) of the APA, which
exempts matters from APA review when the relevant “statute preclude[s]
judicial review” or the “agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law.” 296 The government would surely move to dismiss any action seeking
review under the APA of the Secretary of the Treasury’s five determinations
(or all seven) on the ground that Dodd–Frank makes these findings
unreviewable. Absent a constitutional avoidance issue, we would regard the
government’s argument as a dispositive objection. While Dodd–Frank does
not expressly preclude review of these five determinations, it specifically
states that the district court can only consider the two delineated determinations. And the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court are expressly limited
to those two determinations in their review. Courts have previously found
that a statute’s inclusion of one type of review should be regarded as
excluding other types of review. 297 That inference is particularly strong
under Dodd–Frank’s language. Once the constitutional avoidance canon is
added to the mix, however, it becomes a closer call. Given the strong
arguments that Dodd–Frank’s review provisions violate due process and
Article III, a court would likely strain mightily to find that APA review has
296F

297F

298F
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See supra text accompanying note 237.
Administrative Procedure Act, § 5 U.S.C. 701(a) (2012).
See, e.g., Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 347 (1984) (finding that the omission
of a provision in the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937 allowing for judicial review of the
Secretary of Agriculture’s issuance of market orders was “sufficient reason to believe that Congress
intended to foreclose consumer participation in the regulatory process”).
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not been precluded and can therefore supplement Dodd–Frank’s procedural
deficiencies. 298 A sensible court would, of course, seek to harmonize APA
review with the congressional judgment that the appointment of a receiver
must be resolved quickly and confidentially and, accordingly, would likely
set a timetable for APA review that requires considerable dispatch and
maintains secrecy, at least until a final judgment is reached.
The government might also argue that, even if review of the five determinations is not precluded by statute, these determinations are committed
to agency discretion by law. One common refrain here is that matters are
presumptively reviewable as long as there is “law to apply.” 299 The five
determinations Dodd–Frank sets out for the Secretary’s consideration (in
addition to the two made reviewable by the district court) vary in terms of
whether they seem to be left to the Secretary’s discretion or require the
Secretary’s application of law to fact. For example, whether the failure of a
financial firm would have “serious adverse effects on financial stability in the
United States” would seem to be a determination one would want the
Secretary of the Treasury, not an Article III court, to make. 300 On the other
hand, whether “a Federal regulatory agency has ordered the financial firm to
convert all of its convertible debt instruments that are subject to the regulatory
order” seems to be a factor as to which there is abundant “law to apply.” 301
As long as at least one contested determination includes debatable legal or
factual issues of the sort that courts often adjudicate, the “committed to
agency discretion” argument would fail. Again, courts’ desire to avoid
deeply unsettling constitutional questions might well tip the balance in
favor of finding that at least some of the Secretary of the Treasury’s
determinations are not committed to agency discretion by law.
29F

30F

301F

302F

298 Judicial attitudes about the canon of avoiding constructions of doubtful constitutionality
are mixed. Some decisions say that the canon comes into play only when the underlying statute
(here, the APA) is genuinely ambiguous or indeterminate. E.g., Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S.
52, 59-60 (1997). Other decisions invoke the canon to support reading implicit limitations into
seemingly unqualified statutory language. E.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688-99 (2001);
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 505 (1979). For decisions discussing the use of the
avoidance canon in the bankruptcy context, see Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2605 (2011);
United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 81-82 (1982).
299 See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-600 (1988) (providing that “review is not to
be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to
judge the agency’s exercise of discretion” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Citizens
to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (stating that “the Administrative
Procedure Act is applicable in those rare instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms
that there is no law to apply” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
300 Dodd–Frank Act § 203(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(2) (2012).
301 Id. § 203(b)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(6).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIONS

Dodd–Frank’s orderly liquidation authority may be vulnerable on other
constitutional grounds that implicate the authority of Congress to mandate
the kind of receivership contemplated by Title II. This Section looks at two
possible constitutional objections—one grounded in the uniformity
requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause and the other based on the First
Amendment.
A. Uniform Laws of Bankruptcy
The Constitution confers power on Congress to adopt “uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” 302 One
possible objection to Dodd–Frank’s OLA is that it does not constitute a
uniform bankruptcy regime. Instead, the government is instructed to
determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether to subject a nonbank financial
firm to ordinary rules of bankruptcy or to put the firm on a different track
reserved for systemically significant nonbank financial firms. The result is
different resolution processes for different financial firms, based on a highly
discretionary determination by executive branch agencies as to which is
more appropriate. The fact that Title II contains significantly more punitive
elements than the ordinary bankruptcy regime makes this discretionary
authority especially problematic. A distinct uniformity objection to the
OLA is that the statute authorizes the FDIC to treat similarly situated
creditors differently if necessary to maximize the value of the failing firm’s
assets, to initiate or continue operations essential to receivership, or to
minimize losses. 303 In the Big Spring litigation, the state plaintiffs cite this
potential lack of uniformity as grounds for establishing their standing to
challenge the constitutionality of Dodd–Frank. 304
The meaning of the “uniform laws” limitation in the Bankruptcy Clause
is not entirely clear. 305 The leading case, Railway Labor Executives Ass’n v.
Gibbons, construed the limitation to mean that Congress has no power to
30F
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Dodd–Frank Act § 210(b)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(b)(4).
See supra text accompanying notes 192-194.
The Federalist Papers contain only one sentence about the Bankruptcy Power. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 221 ( James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001) (“The power of establishing
uniform laws of bankruptcy, is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will
prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie, or be removed into different
States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.”).
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enact a law reorganizing a single debtor. 306 Thus, under Gibbons, if Congress
were to enact a law prescribing an orderly liquidation procedure applicable
only to a single nonbank financial firm, the law could be challenged as an
unconstitutional exercise of the bankruptcy power. The question is whether
a similar conclusion follows when Congress prescribes a specialized resolution
authority for a subset of financial firms and gives the executive branch broad
discretion in applying this specialized regime.
In Gibbons, the Supreme Court considered the Rock Island Railroad
Transition and Employee Assistance Act (RITA), a law passed specifically
to address the circumstances of the Rock Island Railroad bankruptcy. 307
Among other things, the law required the railroad’s bankruptcy trustee to
provide certain economic benefits to railroad employees who were not hired
by other railroad carriers. 308 In considering whether RITA was constitutional,
the Court addressed two issues: First, whether RITA should be regarded as
having been enacted pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause, which requires
laws passed under it to be “uniform,” or pursuant to the Commerce Clause,
which lacks this uniformity requirement. 309 Second, whether the Bankruptcy
Clause’s uniformity requirement prohibits a bankruptcy law that applies to
only one debtor. 310
The first issue—whether RITA was enacted pursuant to the Bankruptcy
Clause or the Commerce Clause—was critical, because the Court recognized that “if [the Court] were to hold that Congress had the power to enact
nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, [it] would
eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress to
enact bankruptcy laws.” 311 The Court therefore had to determine whether
RITA fell within the ambit of the bankruptcy power. After surveying its
prior decisions, the Gibbons court concluded that the bankruptcy power
“extends to all cases where the law causes to be distributed, the property of
the debtor among his creditors.” 312 Congress’s bankruptcy power “includes
the power to discharge the debtor from his contracts and legal liabilities, as
well as to distribute his property.” 313 In short, the Court held that any law
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306 See 455 U.S. 457, 471 (1982) (“[T]he uniformity requirement of the [Bankruptcy] Clause
prohibits Congress from enacting bankruptcy laws that specifically apply to the affairs of only one
named debtor.”).
307 Id. at 462-63.
308 Id. at 462.
309 Id. at 468-69.
310 Id. at 470-71.
311 Id. at 468-69.
312 Id. at 466 (quoting Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 186 (1902)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
313 Id. (quoting Hanover Nat’l Bank, 186 U.S. at 188) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that discharges the contracts and other legal liabilities of a debtor and
distributes its property among creditors is a law adopted under the bankruptcy
power. 314 Under the rationale of Gibbons, therefore, Title II of Dodd–Frank
must be regarded as enacted pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause and thus
subject to its “uniform laws” requirement.
With respect to the second issue, the Gibbons court acknowledged that
the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause “is not a straightjacket
that forbids Congress to distinguish among classes of debtors, nor does it
prohibit Congress from recognizing that state laws do not treat commercial
transactions in a uniform manner.” 315 In addition, the Court recognized
Congress’s power to “take into account differences that exist between
different parts of the country, and to fashion legislation to resolve geographically
isolated problems,” as it had done in the Conrail bankruptcy. 316 But RITA
was a different matter:
315F

316F

317F

The employee protection provisions of RITA cover neither a defined class
of debtors nor a particular type of problem, but a particular problem of one
bankrupt railroad. Albeit on a rather grand scale, RITA is nothing more
than a private bill such as those Congress frequently enacts under its authority
to spend money. 317
318F

The Court concluded that “[t]he language of the Bankruptcy Clause itself
compels us to hold that such a bankruptcy law is not within the power of
Congress to enact.” 318
The Court supported this conclusion by examining the history of the
Bankruptcy Clause. 319 The Clause was added to the Constitution during
deliberations about the problem of affording full faith and credit to the legal
actions of other states. 320 Several states had followed the practice of passing
private bills to relieve individual debtors, and questions had been raised
about whether other states were obliged to recognize the relief granted by
these acts. 321 The Court thus opined that “the Bankruptcy Clause’s
319F

320F

321F

32F

314
315
316

Id. at 466-67.
Id. at 469.
Id. (quoting Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 159 (1974)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
317 Id. at 470-71.
318 Id. at 471.
319 Id. at 471-72.
320 Id.
321 Id.
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uniformity requirement was drafted in order to prohibit Congress from
enacting private bankruptcy laws.” 322
After Gibbons, therefore, it is presumably unconstitutional for Congress
to enact a law providing special rules applicable solely to the resolution of a
specific nonbank financial firm. It should thus also be unconstitutional for
Congress to delegate authority to the executive branch to adopt specialized
rules for the reorganization of a single nonbank financial firm. Congress
cannot delegate to an agency power that exceeds Congress’s own authority
to act. 323 Does Dodd–Frank overstep the limitations of Congress’s
bankruptcy power? It certainly comes close, given the extraordinary
discretion granted to the Treasury Department and allied federal agencies in
determining whether a financial company should be reorganized under Title
II, as opposed to under general bankruptcy laws. Title II’s OLA may never
be invoked, or may be invoked so rarely that it is tantamount to a one-off
bankruptcy regime. Nonetheless, the decision whether to apply such a
regime will be left almost entirely to the executive branch’s discretion, under
a statute that disallows review of most of that branch’s determinations.
There is, however, a distinction between Dodd–Frank and a bankruptcy
regime that amounts to a private bill. After Dodd–Frank, there are two
insolvency laws applicable to large nonbank financial firms—one for most
nonbank financial firms (the Bankruptcy Code) and the other for firms
deemed too big to fail by the executive (Dodd–Frank Title II). Congress
enacted both laws and has further instructed the executive to decide, on an
ad hoc basis, which of the two packages of insolvency rules should apply in
an individual case. If Congress had prescribed clear legal criteria for determining when Package A, as opposed to Package B, applies and had allowed
ordinary judicial review of the executive’s determination, the coexistence of
these two sets of laws would likely be constitutional. After all, Congress has
legislated different approaches to resolve insolvency in different industries,
like railroads, 324 federally insured depository banks, 325 and insurance
companies. 326 Legislation targeting particular industries inevitably presents
32F

324F

325F

326F

327F

322
323

Id. at 472.
See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (holding that an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power cannot be cured by a limiting administrative
interpretation).
324 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1164–1174 (2012) (delineating provisions pertaining exclusively to the
bankruptcy of railroads).
325 See Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (2012) (establishing the FDIC
as the receiver for all federally insured banks).
326 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2)-(3), (d) (establishing that insurance companies are not entitled
to relief pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code and hence the exclusive venue for such companies’
insolvency relief is found under state law).
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classification questions, which historically have been resolved using ordinary
tools of statutory interpretation.
Dodd–Frank presents a less clear case under the “uniformity” requirement,
because it provides for two different insolvency regimes within a single
industry. Moreover, the factors used to decide which package of rules
applies are highly discretionary and, as previously discussed, the provisions
for judicial review are severely truncated. By enacting Dodd–Frank,
Congress has essentially proclaimed the following: here is a new package of
bankruptcy rules for firms that are too big to fail, and the executive gets to
decide, with essentially unreviewable discretion, which firms fall into that
category. 327 It is difficult to describe this as a “uniform law” of bankruptcy,
but it presents a problem of a different order from the statute invalidated in
Gibbons. So the uniformity objection, as applied to Dodd–Frank, would sail
into largely uncharted waters. Given that Dodd–Frank sets forth a regime
for resolving the insolvency of firms that are too big to fail and does not
seek to dictate special treatment for specific classes of creditors in pending
cases, we doubt that the courts would extend Gibbons to reach this situation.
But the argument is not frivolous.
What then about the other uniformity problem cited by the Big Spring
plaintiffs—that is, the Dodd–Frank provision allowing the FDIC to treat
similarly situated creditors differently in order to maximize the value of the
328F

327 A constitutional purist might insist that Dodd–Frank gives so much discretion to the
executive in this regard that it violates the nondelegation doctrine. We do not pursue this inquiry
here, because the Supreme Court has refused to find a nondelegation violation provided Congress
has laid down any kind of standard to govern executive decisionmaking. See, e.g., Whitman, 531
U.S. at 474-76 (finding that the Clean Air Act’s instruction to the EPA to set “ambient air quality
standards” as “requisite to protect the public health,” without providing outer bounds for such
EPA regulations, “fits comfortably within the scope of [agency] discretion permitted by [the
Court’s] precedent”); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249-53 (1947) (holding that the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board’s regulatory discretion is guided by “well-known and generally acceptable
standards” drawn from the long history of banking regulation and corporate management and
hence does not violate the nondelegation doctrine). Dodd–Frank sets forth seven “determinations”
that must be made before a receivership is commenced, which is more than enough to meet the lax
requirements of the contemporary nondelegation doctrine. To be sure, decisions like Fahey have
stressed that broad delegations are permissible, in part, because judicial review is available to hold
the executive in check. 332 U.S. at 256; see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (1976)
(Leventhal, J., concurring) (“Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly—
and courts have upheld such delegations—because there is court review to assure that the agency
exercises the delegated power within statutory limits, and that it fleshes out objectives within
those limits by an administration that is not irrational or discriminatory.”). As previously
discussed, judicial review of the decision to seize a firm and put it into receivership is sharply
limited under Dodd–Frank. Whether courts will continue to stress the need for judicial review,
however, is unclear. See Thomas W. Merrill, Delegation and Judicial Review, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 73 (2010) (considering the constitutionality of broad delegations of power in the absence of
judicial review).

230

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 165

firm’s assets? 328 Assuming that Dodd–Frank does in fact contemplate that
the FDIC can pick and choose among similarly situated creditors, 329 it is
not clear that such discretion would constitute a violation of the “uniform
laws” requirement. One can have a law that uniformly provides for dissimilar,
or even random, treatment of similarly situated claimants. An example
might be a bankruptcy law providing that creditors will be selected for
payment by lottery. We do not suggest that such a law would be desirable;
uniform treatment of similarly situated creditors is an unquestionably
important policy of the bankruptcy laws and is critical to overcoming the
competitive race among creditors to capture a limited pool of assets, which
bankruptcy is designed to prevent. 330 By permitting the FDIC to treat
similarly situated creditors differently, Dodd–Frank may incite a competitive
race between creditors to influence federal regulators to favor one over
others. Nevertheless, deviation from sound bankruptcy principles does not
necessarily equate to a violation of the uniformity requirement. In our view,
“uniform laws” means that one debtor cannot constitutionally be singled out
for dissimilar treatment, but it is probably a stretch to say the Constitution
requires that all similarly situated creditors be treated alike.
329F

30F

31F

B. First Amendment
The Dodd–Frank Act’s provision imposing stiff criminal penalties on
persons who disclose truthful information about pending cases in an Article
III judicial proceeding is also vulnerable to constitutional challenge. 331 Of
course, judicial proceedings are sometimes conducted in camera, such as
when a grand jury considers whether to bring a criminal indictment or when
the government seeks a search or arrest warrant. Discovery materials or
settlement agreements can also be kept under seal, as when the parties
stipulate to a confidentiality agreement. However, the idea that a defendant
32F

328
329

Dodd–Frank Act § 210(b)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(b)(4) (2012).
The statute, in fact, says that all claimants “that are similarly situated . . . shall be treated
in a similar manner,” subject to exception where the FDIC determines it is necessary to deviate
from equality in order to maximize the value of estate assets. Id. The government argued in Big
Spring that this exception would apply only in narrow circumstances, such as where payment to
utilities should be continued to keep on the company’s lights. A narrowing construction to this
effect would greatly undermine the States’ argument regarding dissimilar treatment of creditors.
See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) at 46-48, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v.
Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d. 127 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-1032), ECF No. 26.
330 See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 758
(1984) (“The essence of a collective proceeding such as bankruptcy is ratable distribution among
those similarly situated.”).
331 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(C).
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in an adversarial judicial proceeding brought by the government can,
without his or her consent, be criminally punished for disclosing truthful
facts about that proceeding is without precedent.
One can readily imagine circumstances in which Dodd–Frank’s statutory
gag rule would raise serious First Amendment concerns. For instance,
suppose a financial firm is notified that a petition has been filed to appoint a
receiver to liquidate the firm under Title II. The firm believes that the
petition has been filed because it has been placed on the President’s
“enemies list,” aimed at punishing those firms that have not contributed to
his reelection campaign. The firm further concludes that its only hope of
salvation is to leak information about the pending receivership to the press
in an effort to rally opposition to the executive’s move. Dodd–Frank would
deter such a disclosure by imposing criminal punishment of up to five years’
imprisonment for speaking out about these occurrences. 332
A First Amendment challenge to Dodd–Frank’s gag rule may never
arise, because, typically, none of the parties to the receivership proceeding
will have an interest in disclosure. Other than the executive branch officials
and court personnel involved, only the officers and directors of the targeted
firm will know about the proceeding, “and they are probably the last ones
who would want the petition for a receivership to be disclosed.” 333 This is
particularly true in a case where the firm is about to collapse and the
government is acting in good faith when invoking the OLA. But, as with
other provisions of the Bill of Rights, Congress adopted the First Amendment
on the assumption that the government would not always operate in good
faith. It is likely that Dodd–Frank’s criminal penalties for disclosing truthful
information about an OLA proceeding could be challenged only by someone
proposing to engage in potentially criminal conduct. 334 So the critical
question is whether its constitutionality would be sustained in such a context.
3F

34F

35F

332
333
334

Id.
Baird & Morrison, supra note 48, at 298.
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA appears to bar an anticipatory challenge to the gag
rule by a creditor anxious to receive information about a petition to put a financial firm into
receivership. 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146-54 (2013) (explaining that a party’s standing theory cannot rest
on a speculative chain of possibilities that does not establish that its potential injury is certainly
impending). The Court has occasionally allowed parties to challenge statutes that impair the First
Amendment rights of third parties, but only if they can show some kind of actual injury to
themselves. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (explaining that the Supreme
Court has altered its traditional rules on standing to permit litigants “to challenge a statute not
because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or
assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression”). We assume that a purely anticipatory challenge
to Dodd–Frank’s gag rule would fail unless the party bringing the challenge could show that it, or
some other entity with which it had a close relationship, was likely to be subject to the gag rule in
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The government might argue that the gag rule is analogous to rules
prohibiting witnesses in grand jury proceedings from disclosing their
testimony. 335 But grand jury proceedings are not a final determination of
criminal liability. If the grand jury returns an indictment, the defendant is
free at trial to call relevant witnesses to testify in open court in an effort to
be exonerated. 336 In contrast, once a petition to appoint a receiver is
approved under Dodd–Frank’s OLA, a receivership commences that
inevitably leads to liquidation of the targeted firm and other irrevocable
consequences, such as the elimination of stockholder equity, the limitation
on creditors’ rights to recover more than the liquidation value of their
claims, and the dismissal of all “responsible” officers and directors. In this
sense, the Dodd–Frank gag rule is more analogous to an order closing a
public trial—something highly disfavored under the First Amendment. 337
The government may also seek to analogize the gag rule to the rules of
secrecy associated with proceedings to obtain search warrants, confidentiality
agreements, civil commitment proceedings, or juvenile trials. But these
various secrecy rules can be explained on grounds of consent. Government
employees involved in judicial proceedings for issuing warrants or orders for
national security wiretaps can be prohibited from disclosing what goes on in
these proceedings, because they have explicitly or implicitly agreed to these
constraints by accepting public employment. 338 Confidentiality agreements
36F

37F

38F

39F

the near future. See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 281, at 165-74 (discussing the cases
permitting “overbreadth” challenges under the First Amendment).
335 See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979) (explaining the
importance of the gag rule for grand jury testimony, noting that “[f]ear of future retribution or
social stigma may act as powerful deterrents to those who would come forward and aid the grand
jury in the performance of its duties”); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 68182 (1958) (“One [reason for maintaining the secrecy of grand jury proceedings] is to encourage all
witnesses to step forward and testify freely without fear of retaliation.”).
336 Cf. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 633-36 (1990) (holding that publication of grand
jury testimony may not be prohibited once the term of the grand jury is over).
337 In the context of adult criminal trials, the Court has held that even if the prosecutor and
the defendant agree to make the proceedings confidential, the First Amendment allows interested
third parties (such as the press) to object on First Amendment grounds. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co.
v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 505-08 (1984) (discussing the importance of open trials
and explaining their origin in pre–Norman Conquest England); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-73 (1980) (chronicling the history of the modern trial and the
presumption of openness and noting that “[t]his is no quirk of history; rather, it has long been
recognized as an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American trial”).
338 See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (holding that the requirement
that a former CIA agent get the CIA’s approval prior to publishing a memoir regarding his time at
the agency was not an unconstitutional restraint on free speech, because the agent had voluntarily
signed an agreement to that effect both at the commencement and at the termination of his
employment).
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are also based on consent, as when parties agree not to disclose the existence
of a civil action or, more commonly, the settlement of a civil action. 339 Civil
commitment and juvenile justice proceedings are also often confidential.
Typically, though, the party against whom the action is directed, due to the
sensitive nature of the information about him or her that may be revealed,
fully supports maintaining the confidentiality of the proceeding. Given that
government employees and parties to lawsuits can consent to secrecy,
Dodd–Frank’s gag rule is presumably justifiable as applied to Treasury
Department or FDIC officials, as well as to court personnel, because these
officials have consented to preserve confidential information pertaining to
their public functions. 340 But threatening officers or directors of a targeted
firm with criminal punishment for disclosing truthful information about a
court proceeding in which they are involuntarily involved is different. When
the government brings a civil action against a party and that party seeks to
disclose truthful information about the proceeding, there is little precedent
suggesting that the party can be criminally punished for doing so.
A possible analogy is provided by the National Security Letters (NSLs)
authorized by the USA PATRIOT Act. 341 The Act allows the government
to issue NSLs requesting records from wire or electronic communications
providers as part of an investigation of potential terrorist activity and
prohibits those service providers from disclosing that such information has
been requested.342 The Second Circuit has held that there can be a compelling
governmental interest in preserving the confidentiality of NSLs, 343 but the
relevant First Amendment authority requires that any such restraint on
speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interest in
confidentiality. 344 The court further concluded that the government must
bear the burden of proving, in each case, that there is good reason to believe
that disclosure of a NSL would jeopardize a national security investigation. 345
340F

341F

342F

34F

34F

345F

346F

339 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36-37 (1984) (holding that a protective
order prohibiting a newspaper from publishing information that it had obtained through civil
discovery procedures did not offend the First Amendment).
340 See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465-66 (1995) (recognizing
that “Congress may impose restraints on the job-related speech of public employees that would be
plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large”).
341 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
342 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a), (c) (2012).
343 See generally John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2009).
344 Id. at 871.
345 See id. at 883 (upholding the nondisclosure requirement only when “senior FBI officials
certify that disclosure may result in an enumerated harm that is related to an authorized investigation
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There are, of course, significant differences between the nondisclosure
requirement in the PATRIOT Act and Dodd–Frank. One question is
whether the governmental interest in preserving the confidentiality of an
OLA petition is as compelling as that in preserving the secrecy of an
investigation aimed at preventing terrorism. If one assumes premature
disclosure of an OLA proceeding could trigger widespread financial panic,
the answer is presumably yes. A financial panic would be devastating to the
national economy, inflicting damage of a different sort than a terrorist
attack, but nevertheless something to be equally avoided if possible.
Another question under Dodd–Frank is whether the First Amendment
requires a case-specific justification of the need for secrecy, as the Second
Circuit held in the context of a NSL. 346 Dodd–Frank, in its current form,
does not require the government to demonstrate the need for confidentiality
each time it initiates an OLA proceeding. Congress apparently assumed
that confidentiality would always be required in order to prevent a financial
crisis analogous to a run on the bank. But this assumption is not necessarily
correct. One can imagine a case in which the insolvency of a systemically
significant nonbank financial firm is publicly known before the government
commences an OLA proceeding, perhaps because the firm has filed for
bankruptcy. In such a case, news of the firm’s failure would already have
been absorbed by the market, and it is not clear why application of the gag
rule would be necessary. So perhaps an individualized justification of
secrecy ought to be required in the OLA context, too.
There is a more fundamental reason why Dodd–Frank’s gag rule fails the
narrow tailoring requirement. When enacting the statute, Congress had the
option of structuring the OLA like an ordinary bank receivership, providing
for plenary judicial review of the decision to appoint a receiver ex post
rather than ex ante. Allowing for judicial hearing only after appointment of
the receiver eliminates any need for secrecy, as well as any need for a rush to
judgment and the other problems previously considered in connection with
a due process or Article III challenge. Once again, we see that the Senate’s
injection of a federal district court into the process of appointing a receiver
was an unforced error generating constitutional problems that could have
readily been avoided.
347F

to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
346 Id.
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V. TAKINGS ISSUES
We conclude with a discussion of takings issues presented by Dodd–Frank.
Title II contains a number of provisions that could conceivably give rise to
takings claims. It is difficult to speak with any certainty about how these
might be resolved because, short of outright seizure or destruction of a
recognized property right by the government, takings claims are resolved
under an ad hoc regime that critically depends on the specific facts presented.347
We will briefly note some situations that seem particularly likely to generate
future takings claims and then offer a more complete analysis of the largest
takings issue looming on the horizon: impairment of secured creditor claims
to avoid taxpayer-funded bailouts.
Tracking the language of the Constitution, 348 takings claims can potentially
present four issues: (1) Does the claimant have an interest in “private
property?” (2) Has the government “taken” this property? (3) If so, was the
taking for a “public use?” (4) Has the government made adequate provision
to provide “just compensation” for the taking? 349
Of these four issues, the “public use” question is the least likely to be
contested. Most would agree that vigorous government action to prevent or
forestall a financial crisis—the very premise for exercising Title II authority—
is a legitimate public use. 350 To be sure, just because the Title II process as a
whole satisfies the public use requirement, it does not necessarily follow
that every seizure of property undertaken pursuant to a Title II proceeding
is also for a public use. Still, assuming there is some nexus between the
seizure and the purposes of Title II, a public use challenge will likely fail. 351
The “property,” “taking,” and “just compensation” issues are more likely to
348F

349F

350F

351F

352F

347 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (characterizing the
Court’s approach to resolving takings claims as “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries”).
348 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation.”).
349 For an overview of these four issues, see generally DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W.
MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 58-209 (2002).
350 The Supreme Court has defined public use broadly to include public benefit or
advantage. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480-81 (2005) (noting that the
Supreme Court has historically defined the “public purpose” as needed to justify exercise of
eminent domain power broadly, reflecting the longstanding policy of judicial deference to
legislative judgments in this field); see also DANA & MERRILL, supra note 349, at 191-98 (tracing
emergence of the broad definition).
351 The public use issue must ordinarily be resolved before the taking occurs, because the
taking should be enjoined if the government cannot proffer a public use rationale. See generally D.
Zachary Hudson, Eminent Domain Due Process, 119 YALE L.J. 1280 (2010). Dodd–Frank’s OLA
provisions offer no clear mechanism to raise the public use issue before the seizure of a financial
firm. If a claimant has a legitimate public use objection, this would be an additional constitutional
reason to condemn the statute.
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arise, if and when the OLA is used and an aggrieved stakeholder elects to
pursue a takings claim.
A. Some Possible Takings Claims
1. Assessments
Given its desire to avoid anything resembling a bailout of failed financial
firms, Dodd–Frank requires repayment if Treasury funds are used to
support a financial firm during the resolution process. 352 The first source of
repayment is the firm’s stakeholders: shareholders are wiped out and
unsecured creditors have their claims reduced, to zero if necessary. If this
still leaves a debt to the Treasury, then Dodd–Frank provides that the
FDIC can impose “assessments” on a broad list of financial institutions. 353
Those eligible to be tapped include any bank holding company with at least
fifty billion dollars in assets, any nonbank financial company subject to
systemic risk oversight under Title I, and any other “financial company”
with assets of at least fifty billion dollars. 354
Financial firms that are assessed to pay for the resolution of some other
insolvent financial firm may argue that such a monetary exaction constitutes
an unconstitutional taking of property. Although the Supreme Court has
not enforced the principle for many decades, older authority exists for the
proposition that special assessments disproportionate to any benefits
conferred constitute takings. 355 Today, a threshold question would be
whether such a general monetary liability can be challenged as a taking at
all. The Court has held that the Takings Clause applies only to takings of
identified property rights or the imposition of monetary liabilities tied to
identified property rights and does not apply to general financial liabilities,
such as taxes, fines, or fees. 356 A general assessment, if not tied to particular
assets of financial firms, seems to fall on the “general liability” side of the line.
35F

354F

35F

356F

357F

352
353
354
355

Dodd–Frank Act § 204(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5384(d) (2012).
Id. § 210(o)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(o)(1)(B).
Id. § 210(o)(1)(A), (D)(ii)(II), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(o)(1)(A), (D)(ii)(II).
See, e.g., Vill. of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 279 (1898) (“[T]he exaction from the
owner of private property of the cost of a public improvement in substantial excess of the special
benefits accruing to him is, to the extent of such excess, a taking, under the guise of taxation, of
private property for public use without compensation.”); cf. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430, 435 (1905) (permitting assessments based on general
criteria such as frontage footing). For a discussion of the evolution of federal law on special
assessments, see Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86
YALE L.J. 385, 469-73 (1977).
356 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013) (holding
that the demands for money at issue in the case operated upon an identified property interest by
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Whether or not the Takings Clause applies, the government will likely
argue that liability for such assessments is analogous to a constitutionally
permissible special tax to help redress a problem unique to the industry
being taxed, such as a tax on chemical feedstock to pay for hazardous waste
cleanups. 357 A financial firm that objects to paying assessments would likely
stress the unfairness of forcing it to fund a general public good—prevention
of a financial crisis—when there is no required finding that it was at fault or
even causally connected to behavior that gave rise to the crisis. Whether this
argument would succeed if framed as a takings claim is doubtful but not
entirely implausible. 358
358F

359F

directing the owner of a particular piece of property to make a monetary payment, which
constituted a monetary obligation burdening the petitioner’s ownership of a specific parcel of
land); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540-42 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part) (finding that the Coal Act did not present a takings issue because it did not
“operate upon or alter an identified property interest”); id. at 554-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(agreeing that “[t]his case involves not an interest in physical or intellectual property, but an
ordinary liability to pay money, and not to the Government, but to third parties,” and hence the
Takings Clause does not apply). For an argument that general financial obligations should be
immune from scrutiny under the Takings Clause, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of
Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 974-78 (2000).
357 An earlier version of the Dodd–Frank Act provided for the creation of such a fund, supplied
by taxes on qualifying financial firms. See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1609(n)-(o) (2009) (creating a $150 billion “Systemic Dissolution
Fund” funded by ex ante assessments on financial firms with more than $50 billion in assets). The
Senate’s version also provided for assessments on large financial companies, but these would be
imposed ex post. 156 CONG. REC. S4078, § 210(n)-(o) (daily ed. May 20, 2010). This divergence
was almost certainly motivated by the Senate’s desire to reduce the perception that the statute
contemplated taxpayer-funded bailouts. See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, FINANCIAL
REFORM: 2010, PREPARING FOR THE HOUSE-SENATE CONFERENCE ON H.R. 4173 38-39 (2010),
available
at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/PreparingForHouse-Senate
ConferenceOnHR4173.pdf (noting that the House’s version contained no explicit prohibitions on
the use of taxpayer funds to prevent the liquidation of a covered financial company). Similarly, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or,
as more commonly known, Superfund), as originally enacted, provided for a tax on chemical
companies. Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 4461, 94 Stat. 2767, 2798-99 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4661
(1982)) (imposing a tax on certain chemicals); id. at § 4481, 94 Stat. at 2804 (1980) (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 4681 (1982)) (imposing a tax on receipt of hazardous waste). These taxes, in turn,
supplied a fund for cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Id. § 221, 94 Stat. at 2801-02 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 9631 (1982)) (establishing a “Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund”); id. § 232, 94
Stat. at 2804-05 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9641 (1982)) (establishing a “Post-closure Liability Trust
Fund”). The tax expired in 1995 and has not been reauthorized. See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR &
MARK REISCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33426, SUPERFUND: OVERVIEW AND SELECTED
ISSUES 10-11 (2006) (noting that the Superfund taxing authority expired on December 31, 1995).
358 For an analogous argument, albeit in a dissenting opinion, see Pennell v. City of San Jose,
485 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that forcing
landlords to accept reduced rents based on “tenant hardship” when the landlord bears no
responsibility for that hardship constitutes a taking).
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2. Executive Pay Clawbacks

Dodd–Frank requires the removal of financial firm officers and directors
if they are found to have been “responsible” for the company’s financial
failure. 359 It also permits the FDIC to claw back any compensation those
individuals received during the two-year period prior to the start of the
receivership. 360 The clawback is not limited to excessive compensation nor is
there any statutory requirement of specific misconduct on the part of the
officer that produced inflated compensation. To the contrary, the statute
instructs the FDIC to weigh the “financial and deterrent benefits” of a
clawback against “the cost of executing the recovery.” 361 This seems to
mandate a clawback whenever it would be cost effective to do so, without
regard to the officer’s culpability or the size of his or her compensation package.
Executives subject to such clawbacks might argue that Dodd–Frank goes
far beyond traditional notions of avoidable preferences and fraudulent
conveyances in bankruptcy,362 amounting to nothing more than an expropriation
of their wealth in order to promote the general good of financial stability.
The government would likely respond that Dodd–Frank’s executive clawbacks are consistent with other recently enacted clawback provisions, 363 such
as those in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 364 and the TARP legislation 365—both of
which are generally recognized as equitable and fair. The outcome, again, is
difficult to predict, and will likely turn on what a court deems the relevant
baseline for establishing legitimate expectations about the vulnerability of
executives to salary clawbacks. If the baseline is that of the Bankruptcy
Code, executives would have a chance of prevailing; if the baseline traces
more recent legislative trends, their chances diminish.
360F

361F

362F

36F

364F

365F

359
360
361
362

36F

Dodd–Frank Act § 204(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5384(a)(2) (2012).
Id. § 210(s)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(s)(1).
Id. § 210(s)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(s)(2).
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (2012) (allowing the trustee to avoid transfers made by the
debtor to insiders between ninety days and one year of the debtor filing for bankruptcy); cf. id.
§ 547(c) (prohibiting a trustee from avoiding a transfer that was made to any creditor in “a
contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor”).
363 See generally Spencer C. Barasch & Sara J. Chesnut, Controversial Uses of the “Clawback”
Remedy in the Current Financial Crisis, 72 TEX. B.J. 922 (2009) (summarizing the use of clawback
legal remedies in the recent financial scandals and predicting aggressive use of clawbacks in the
future).
364 See 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2012) (requiring the forfeiture of certain payments received by
CEOs and CFOs within twelve months of the release of any financial statement that has to be
restated due to a reporting error resulting from “misconduct”).
365 See 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(3)(B) (2012) (requiring senior executives and other top paid
employees to return any incentive compensation they received in connection with the release of
favorable financial statements later found to be materially inaccurate).
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3. Revival of Barred Actions

Dodd–Frank contains an unusual provision that allows the FDIC as
receiver to bring tort claims on behalf of the entity in receivership, even
though the statute of limitations for the state-based cause of action has
expired. 366 The provision permits the FDIC to recover funds from former
managers and others who allegedly caused financial loss to the covered
financial firm. The covered claims include those arising from “fraud, intentional misconduct resulting in unjust enrichment, or intentional misconduct
resulting in a substantial loss to the covered financial company.” 367 Fraud
and unjust enrichment are well-established common law causes of action;
“intentional misconduct resulting in substantial loss,” however, is not, which
makes the exact scope of this provision unclear. The statute of limitations
must have expired within five years of appointing the FDIC as receiver for
the claim to be eligible for revival. 368
Those targeted in such cases may claim that reviving a cause of action
for damages previously barred by the statute of limitations is a taking of
property. The Supreme Court has held that reviving actions barred by the
statute of limitations is a taking, 369 but more often finds that such actions
are not takings. 370 Reviving liabilities previously barred by the statute of
limitations interferes with the repose these statutes are designed to promote.
Perhaps, not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has declared legislative
revivals of liability unconstitutional under provisions other than the Takings
Clause. 371 Thus, it is difficult to predict with any confidence how such
legislative action reviving tort liability would ultimately be assessed today
under a takings challenge.
367F

368F

369F

370F

371F

372F

366
367
368
369

Dodd–Frank Act § 210(a)(10)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(10)(C).
Id. § 210(a)(10)(C)(ii), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(10)(C)(ii).
Id. § 210(a)(10)(C)(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(10)(C)(i).
See, e.g., William Danzer & Co., Inc. v. Gulf & Ship Island R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 633, 637
(1925) (finding that allowing the plaintiff to file a claim with the Interstate Commerce Commission
previously barred by the statute of limitations “would be to deprive defendant of its property
without due process of law in contravention of the Fifth Amendment”).
370 See, e.g., Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1945) (“[I]t cannot be said
that lifting the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of
time is per se an offense against the Fourteenth Amendment.”). See generally Campbell v. Holt, 115
U.S. 620 (1885) (distinguishing between actions to recover real or personal property, where the
expiration of the statute of limitations confers a title by adverse possession or prescription, and
actions to recover a debt, where the statute merely bars enforcement in court).
371 See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 632-33 (2003) (holding that once the statute of
limitations bars a criminal proceeding, reviving the prosecution violates the Ex Post Facto Clause);
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 217-19 (1995) (holding that once a federal court has
dismissed an action as barred by a statute of limitations, legislation allowing the judgment to be
reopened under a longer statute of limitations violates Article III).
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B. Impairment of Security Interests
The most significant takings issues potentially implicated by Dodd–Frank
involve security interests. 372 In the quest to find sources of funding other
than tax revenues to prop up financial firms undergoing resolution, the
House bill, H.R. 4173, required certain secured creditors to take a haircut of
up to ten percent of the value of their security interest if the “amounts
realized from the resolution are insufficient to satisfy completely any
amounts owed to the United States.” 373 Neither of the Senate bills nor the
enacted statute includes such a provision. 374 In a tip of the hat to the House,
the final version of the Act did include a section requiring the Financial
Stability Oversight Council to conduct a study considering whether secured
creditors should be required to take a haircut in future OLA proceedings. 375
The study, completed in July 2011, recommended against amending the
statute to permit impairment of security interests, largely on the ground
that the other powers given by the Act are sufficient to avoid future taxpayer
bailouts without going after secured creditors. 376 Given the Council’s advice,
37F

374F

375F

376F

37F

372 Unsecured claims are commonly reduced or disallowed in bankruptcy and other insolvency
proceedings. See Andrew A. Wood, The Decline of Unsecured Creditor and Shareholder Recoveries in
Large Public Company Bankruptcies, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 429, 436 (2011) (noting that recovery
amounts in large public company bankruptcy cases in 2009 and 2010 declined to fifty-three cents
on the dollar for general unsecured creditors, seventeen cents on the dollar for senior subordinate
debt, and thirteen cents on the dollar for senior unsecured creditors). A state law that retroactively
impairs unsecured creditors’ rights could give rise to a claim under the Contracts Clause. See
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827) (Washington, J.), 292 ( Johnson, J.), 313
(Thompson, J.), 331 (Trimble, J.) (seriatim opinions limiting the Contract Clause to impairments
of existing contracts). But for purposes of the Takings Clause, unsecured claims are regarded as
contract rights, not property rights, and hence impairment by the federal government through
bankruptcy proceedings does not give rise to a Takings Clause issue. As previously noted,
unsecured claims are regarded as property for due process purposes. See Tulsa Prof ’l Collection
Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (finding that a cause of action against an estate for an
unpaid bill qualified as an unsecured claim and that “[l]ittle doubt remains that such an intangible
interest is property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”).
373 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
§ 1609(a)(4)(D)(iv) (2009). The interests that would have been subject to this haircut requirement
were enforceable or perfected security interests in assets arising under qualified financial contracts. Id.
374 Title II as enacted does, however, authorize the FDIC to prescribe rules and regulations
concerning the “rights, interests, and priorities of creditors, counterparties, security entitlement
holders, or other persons with respect to any covered financial company” subject to the OLA.
Dodd–Frank Act § 209, 12 U.S.C. § 5389 (2012).
375 Id. § 215 (not codified).
376 FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
SECURED CREDITOR HAIRCUTS 30 (2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
Documents/report%20to%20congress%20on%20secured%20creditor%20haircuts.pdf.
Former Secretary of the Treasury Geithner regards the proposed ten percent haircut as a
“surefire panic accelerant.” GEITHNER, supra note 9, at 409.
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an amendment of the law to permit impairment of security interests
currently appears unlikely. Nevertheless, there is a very real possibility that
Congress will demand the impairment of secured creditor rights in a future
financial crisis in the interest of avoiding taxpayer liability.
A security interest or a lien is essentially a contingent property right
held by a creditor in specific assets owned by a debtor. 377 In terms of
conventional property forms, security interests can be analogized to executory
interests: they are a nonpossessory future interest that may or may not vest
depending on some future contingency, which is often the debtor’s failure to
satisfy the obligation owed to the creditor. 378 If the debt is repaid in a
timely manner, the security interest is released. However, if the debt is not
repaid on time, the security interest holder gains the right to seize or
compel the sale of the property that secures the debt to generate funds to
satisfy the debt. 379
The Bankruptcy Code implicitly treats security interests like property
rights that belong to the secured creditor, although the Code studiously
avoids labeling the interests as “property.” In a liquidation proceeding, a
secured creditor is entitled to the full amount of its secured claim. 380 The
trustee in bankruptcy can either sell the property subject to the security
interest, 381 in which case the security interest will follow the property, or
sell the property free of the security interest, 382 using proceeds of the sale to
satisfy the secured debt. 383 If the value of the asset is equal to or less than
the unpaid balance due on the debt, the trustee can abandon the property to
the security holder. 384 Security interests are subject to the automatic stay in
bankruptcy, which potentially impairs the value of the security. 385 The Code
requires the trustee to provide “adequate protection” to secured creditors to
minimize losses due to the stay. 386
378F

379F

380F

381F

382F

38F

384F

385F

386F

387F

377 See Douglas G. Baird, Security Interests Reconsidered, 80 VA. L. REV. 2249, 2257 (1994)
(“Security interests under Anglo-American law have always been tied to particular assets. A
creditor acquired an interest in a particular piece of real and personal property and looked to it
first to obtain repayment.”).
378 THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
808-10 (2d ed. 2012).
379 Id.
380 See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) (forbidding “strip[ping] down” a party’s
claim when the claim is a secured lien and fully allowed under the Bankruptcy Code).
381 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)-(c) (2012).
382 Id. § 363(f ) .
383 Id. § 363( j).
384 Id. § 554.
385 Id. § 362.
386 Id. § 363(e).
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Things are more complicated in a reorganization proceeding than in a
liquidation proceeding. In a reorganization proceeding, the bankruptcy
trustee (frequently the debtor in possession) can, with the approval of the
bankruptcy court, decide that the specific asset in which a creditor holds a
security interest is necessary to the success of the reorganized firm. 387 In
this event, the court decides whether or not to keep the secured asset for the
use by the reorganized firm. 388 However, if the court decides to let the firm
keep the asset, the court must perform a valuation of the asset and give the
secured creditor a substitute for its property right—a “secured claim to the
extent of the value of such creditor’s interest.” 389 The Code again requires
that secured creditors given these substitute rights must be given “adequate
protection” to ensure that the secured creditors will receive an “indubitable
equivalent” to the value of the property in which they previously held a
security interest. 390 By allowing the bankruptcy court to substitute other
assets of equivalent financial value for the security interest, the Code treats
security interests as fungible assets equivalent to money and hence as an
asset that the court can exchange for money.
The Dodd–Frank Act follows the Bankruptcy Code in recognizing the
distinctive status of security interests and that security interests are entitled
to adequate protection without regard to the impact protecting such interests
has on other creditors, or on larger objectives such as preventing the
collapse of a systemically significant firm. 391 As in the Bankruptcy Code, the
Dodd–Frank Act does not acknowledge that security interests are property
or that the enlargement of a pool of assets through abrogation of security
interests might raise constitutional questions. 392
38F

389F

390F

391F

392F

39F

387 Id. § 362(d)(2), (g); see also Siobhan Rafferty, Chapter 11 Cases Under Section 362(d)(2):
Does This Include Liquidation?, 1 BANKR. DEV. J. 159, 163-64 (1984) (describing the trustee’s high
burden of proof on the issue that the property is essential to the reorganization).
388 See, e.g., In re Terra Mar Assocs., 3 B.R. 462, 465-66 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980) (identifying
the factors that the court should consider in determining whether the bankrupt debtor can retain a
particular asset, including whether “(1) the secured creditor will suffer imminent and irreparable
injury from the continuation of the stay, (2) the property [at issue] is necessary to effect a
reorganization, and (3) there is a reasonable probability of a successful rehabilitation within a
reasonable time” (citation omitted)).
389 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012).
390 Id. § 361; id. § 362(d)(1); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
391 Dodd–Frank Act § 210(a)(3)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(3)(B) (2012) (“The receiver shall
allow any [secured] claim . . . which is proved to the satisfaction of the receiver.”).
392 Academic commentary about security interests frequently ignores the status of such
interests as property and hence the possible relevance of the Takings Clause. For example, some
commentators have argued that secured creditors lack adequate incentives to monitor distressed
firms and that eliminating the absolute priority rule for secured creditors would encourage better
monitoring. See Baird, supra note 377, at 2259 (citing scholarly opinions explaining when departures
from the absolute priority rule may be warranted). Other scholars have worried that secured
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While Dodd–Frank generally favors preserving security interests, Title
II deviates, in certain respects, from the way security interests are treated in
bankruptcy. The clearest example concerns setoffs, where a creditor holds
funds of an insolvent debtor and then seeks to take those funds as full or
partial satisfaction of an unpaid claim. 393 The Bankruptcy Code treats
setoffs as a type of secured claim; 394 Dodd–Frank does not. 395 Therefore, it
is foreseeable that some creditors holding a setoff which is denied treatment
as a secured claim will argue that this is a taking of property. The question
is whether this type of deviation from the treatment of security interests in
bankruptcy—or other reductions in secured creditor rights in response to
demands for alternative sources of funding for resolutions of systemically
significant firms—could be challenged as a taking.
Under the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that security
interests are “property” protected by the Takings Clause. The Court so held
in a series of Depression-era cases under the Frazier–Lemke Act 396 and in a
later decision involving the abrogation of a materialman’s lien 397 and more
394F

395F

396F

397F

398F

creditors will leave insufficient assets in a bankrupt enterprise to satisfy the claims of nonadjusting
creditors such as tort claimants. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case
for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 934 (1996) (arguing that “full
priority causes excessive use of security interests, reduces the incentive of firms to take adequate
precautions . . . and distorts the monitoring arrangements chosen by firms and their creditors”).
Both arguments presuppose that the absolute priority rule for security interests can be modified
without implicating the Takings Clause.
393 See Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 18 (1995) (“The right of setoff (also
called ‘offset’) allows entities that owe each other money to apply their mutual debts against each
other, thereby avoiding ‘the absurdity of making A pay B when B owes A.’” (quoting Studley v.
Boylston Nat’l Bank of Bos., 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913))).
394 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012).
395 Dodd–Frank Act § 210(a)(7)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(7)(B). The Bankruptcy Code does
not grant setoff rights per se; creditors’ setoff rights are governed by state law. See Strumpf, 516
U.S. at 18 (noting that under the Bankruptcy Code, “whatever right of setoff otherwise exists is
preserved in bankruptcy”). Section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code preserves setoff rights and
acknowledges that a creditor has the right of setoff under state law. 11 U.S.C. § 553. Section
506(a)(1) treats valid setoff rights as a secured claim. See id. § 506(a)(1) (“An allowed claim of a
creditor . . . is a secured claim . . . to the extent of the amount subject to setoff . . . .”).
396 11 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1934) (permitting a farmer to amend his bankruptcy petition and
retain possession of his property under certain alternative payment schemes), invalidated by
Louisville Joint Stock Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); Radford, 295 U.S. at 601-02 (finding
that the Frazier–Lemke Act violated the Fifth Amendment by taking property rights from a bank
without just compensation); see also Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of
Roanoke, 300 U.S. 440, 470 (1937) (upholding an amended version of the Frazier–Lemke Act as
causing a reasonable modification of property rights).
397 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 45-46 (1960) (determining that the petitioners
possessed “compensable property interests within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment”); see also
United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 81-82 (1982) (construing a provision of the
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recently reaffirmed these holdings. 398 These decisions nevertheless leave
many unanswered questions.
One question is whether the status of security interests as property is
subject to prospective modification by legislation or regulatory pronouncement. 399 There is a strong suggestion in United States v. Security Industrial
Bank, a decision arising under the Bankruptcy Code, that prospective
modification of the degree of protection afforded to security interests in
bankruptcy would not be a taking. 400 This might mean, for example, that
creditors who obtain setoff rights after the enactment of Dodd–Frank’s Title
II cannot claim that the failure to treat these rights as property for
bankruptcy purposes is a taking, because Title II announced to the world
that henceforth these rights would not be treated as such. Setoff rights are
close enough to the line between property and contract rights (which are
subject to compromise or even disallowance in bankruptcy) that this kind of
reclassification may be permissible. It is less clear whether an announcement
by Congress (or a federal agency) modifying the absolute priority given to
security interests in bankruptcy would be enough to immunize the government
from any takings claims arising in security interests created thereafter. At
least with respect to interests in land, the Court has been reluctant to regard
every newly legislated or regulated land use restriction as an immediate
qualification of property rights, such that persons who acquire
restricted property in the future are automatically barred by the
39F

40F

401F

Bankruptcy Reform Act to apply only to liens created in the future in order to avoid the constitutional question whether abrogating an existing lien would be a taking).
398 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013) (“[T]he
government must pay just compensation when it takes a lien—a right to receive money that is
secured by a particular piece of property.”); id. at 2600 (referring to the taking of a lien as a “per se
taking”).
399 Compare James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors’ Rights in Reorganization:
A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 973, 1006-09 (1983) (arguing that Congress has complete discretion to modify the priority or
other treatment of secured creditor rights under the Bankruptcy Clause without raising constitutional issues), with Julia Patterson Forrester, Bankruptcy Takings, 51 FLA. L. REV. 851, 893 (1999)
(arguing that prospective modification of secured creditor rights that go beyond settled
background principles of property law can give rise to takings liability).
400 The Court specifically reserved the question whether a provision of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act would apply to security interests established after the Act was passed but before it
became effective. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 82 n.11. But the Court did not similarly reserve the
question whether the amendment would apply to a security interest established after the Act
became fully effective. In effect, the Court implicitly assumed the provision could be applied in a
fully prospective fashion, notwithstanding diminished protection for security interests in
bankruptcy.
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restriction. 401 The Court has acknowledged that property rights are qualified
by “background principles” of property law, such as the understanding that
landowners can be barred from engaging in uses that create nuisances. 402
However, the question whether changes in positive regulations that affect
property automatically qualify as background principles has been met with
inconsistent responses, 403 leaving considerable uncertainty about how the
Court would respond to a law that prospectively modified the absolute
priority of security interests. Delays in foreclosure proceedings have been
around for a long time and might qualify as “background principles”; 404
subordination of security interests to avoid taxpayer bailouts, on the other
hand, might be regarded as a novelty that does not so qualify.
Another question is how haircuts of security interests or other modifications
in the rights of security interest holders should be analyzed in terms of total
or partial takings. Armstrong v. United States held that the total destruction
of a security interest is a taking, 405 anticipating the analysis of Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council 406 in terms of real estate. But if Congress or the
FDIC as receiver shaves ten percent off the principal value of a security
interest in order to reimburse the federal treasury for temporarily financing
a failing firm, would this be regarded as a total taking of ten percent of the
security or only a partial, ten percent taking of the security? In the case of
land, shaving ten percent off the existing acreage is regarded as a total
402F

403F

40F

405F

406F

407F

401 See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629-30 (2001) (declining to recognize a
per se rule that land use regulations in effect at the time of purchase qualify property rights and
are immune from constitutional challenge by subsequent landowners); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992) (holding that, in takings cases brought by a landowner, the
State would need to show that the landowner’s actions violated background principles of nuisance
and property law in order to sustain a claim that no taking occurred); see also Phillips v. Wash.
Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998) (holding that a regulatory requirement imposed on client
funds held in trust by lawyers did not qualify the common law understanding that interest follows
principal).
402 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
403 Compare Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628 (holding that notice of regulation does not automatically
disqualify a takings claim), with Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-08 (1984)
(treating notice of regulation as virtually dispositive of takings claim).
404 See Forrester, supra note 399, at 882-85 (surveying cases involving foreclosure delays as
potential takings).
405 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960) (“The total destruction by the Government of all value of these
liens, which constitute compensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth Amendment
‘taking.’”).
406 505 U.S. at 1031-32 (holding that any regulation that destroys all economically beneficial
value of real property is a taking unless it tracks the common law of nuisance in the relevant
jurisdiction).

246

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 165

taking of ten percent. 407 But imposing a use regulation on the land that
reduces its value by ten percent is only a partial taking and is typically not
compensable. 408 This distinction might suggest, by analogy, that imposing a
ten percent haircut on secured interest holders would be a taking, whereas a
regulation that diminished the value of the security by ten percent (perhaps
by imposing a moratorium on foreclosure) would not be.
Still more questions are presented about what constitutes just compensation
when security interests are impaired. For example, must compensation be
paid for the time value of money when recovery of the equivalent value of
the secured interest is delayed by a resolution process? Under the Bankruptcy
Code, the Court has held, as a matter of statutory construction, that value
lost due to delay is not compensated. 409 But the matter might come out
differently when framed as a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment.
408F

409F

410F

CONCLUSION
The constitutional questions presented by Dodd–Frank’s orderly liquidation
authority can be seen either as a dark portent of an inverted constitutional
order or as a set of easily avoidable mistakes caused by careless last-minute
drafting.
The dark vision goes something like this: The U.S. Constitution, like
American law more generally, is designed for a world in which the government
is seen as a potential threat to private rights, but private rights are not
individually significant enough to pose a threat to government or society
more generally. The Constitution was not designed for a world in which
some privately owned firms are “systemically significant” such that special
rules must be devised to allow the government to take them over and
operate them if those firms take on too much risk and are in danger of
collapse. In order to construct a world in which a central function of the
government is to protect society from firms that are too big to fail, while
nevertheless permitting such firms to continue to exist, constitutional rules
407 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421-22, 441 (1982)
(holding that a regulation that permitted a cable television company to permanently install cable
lines and small cable boxes on the roof of a building was categorically a taking despite its limited
intrusiveness).
408 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498-500 (1987)
(concluding that a percentage of coal subject to a regulation did not constitute “a separate segment
of property for takings law purposes”).
409 See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
377-79 (1988) (holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not require compensation for the time value
of a secured interest).
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must be fundamentally adjusted. Conventional norms of due process,
understandings about the proper functioning of courts, limits on the
legislative power reflected in the Bankruptcy Clause, and even free speech
rights must give way. Property rights must be dissolved into a general mass
of claim rights, subject to reallocation by the government in order to
advance its perception of the requirements of the general welfare. If the
Constitution is supposed to be a bulwark that protects us from our government,
is the Dodd–Frank Act a foretaste of what to expect when the government
becomes the handmaiden of a financial oligarchy?
A more benign vision would stress that most of Dodd–Frank’s constitutional
problems stem from a single ill-considered decision by the Senate to
abandon the judicial review provisions in the Obama administration’s draft
and the House bill in favor of a novel scheme calling for appointment of a
receiver by an Article III court. The Administration’s Combined Draft and
the House bill called for administrative appointment of a receiver, coupled
with a right of plenary post-seizure judicial review. Had Congress adhered to
this conception, which was borrowed from existing banking law, it would
have eliminated serious due process questions, Article III questions, and the
need for a gag rule that raises potential First Amendment questions.
Constitutional issues arising under the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity
requirement could have been laid to rest by drafting a more rule-like and less
discretionary conception of what type of firm is eligible for resolution under
Title II. Additionally, the various takings issues could have been avoided or
made more manageable by tracking more closely to established common law
and bankruptcy law precepts regarding clawbacks, assessments, and the
status of security interests.
These enumerated revisions are relatively minor in the larger scheme of
things. They suggest that Dodd–Frank’s orderly liquidation authority is not
too big for the Constitution—if only Congress had given sufficient
consideration to the Constitution when it drafted this complex and
far-reaching legislation.

